

**Team Leaders Meeting
Mothers' Union building, London
14 February 2006**

Present:

| | |
|---|---|
| Jerry Adams (JA) LRRD policy study | Claude de ville de Goyet (CVG) Needs assessment study |
| Jon Bennet (JB) Coordination study | Rachel Houghton (RH; minutes) TEC/ALNAP |
| Emery Brusset (EB) LRRD Indonesia study | Laura Kitchin (LK; minutes) TEC/ALNAP |
| John Cosgrave (JC) TEC/ALNAP | Wayne Macdonald (WMD) UNICEF |
| Niels Dabelstein (ND) DANIDA | Suppiramaniam Nanthikesan (SN)UNDP |
| Fiona English (FE) DFA (Ireland) | Margaret Stansberry (MS) IFRC |
| Michael Flint (MF) Donor response study | John Telford (JT) TEC/ALNAP |
| Susanne Frueh (SF;Chair) OCHA | Sherylin Thompson (ST) TEC/ALNAP |
| Stefan Germann (SG) WVI | |

Coordination team (Jon Bennet)

- Lack of NGO (international and national) representation on coordinating bodies. (Capacities evaluation focuses on national NGOs.)
- Assumed lead on advocacy by RC/HC, but this was a piecemeal approach and not coordinated. Thus many important issues not picked up – eg, around land tenure. Key ongoing failing in the sector.
- No correlation between no of staff present on the ground and the assistance given to build capacity of local / national organizations. It's one thing to complain about lack of national / local capacity; another to do something about it. (Capacities brings this up.) Linked is lack of communication (also brought up in capacities and LRRD) with national actors, incl local actors. The community just doesn't seem to know how. Coordination study recommends training.
- UNDAC – few resources for transport (helicopters), and 'tension' between assessment, coordination and service (support, common services – UNJLC, etc.)
- UNDAC in Thailand – questionable as to whether required; ended up dealing with body bags, outside their main skills. Should they be dispatched to these type of middle-income countries? Also the quality of the results: found severe criticism of UNDAC in (secondary sourced) materials/assessments.
- Need better resources for relief to recovery, not just in the Flash Appeal. What will happen in 2006 if no CAP appeal launched – will there be no funds for recovery coordination?
- 'Emergency tourism' needs to be addressed. Someone has to regulate all the visits and demands put on field operations due to the visits.
- Language, dynamics and methods of coordination meetings, especially re national and local authorities and actors are important. Meetings as information sharing or decision-making – it is unclear, and time is wasted going over the same issues repeatedly. Staff turnover is a major problem. Meetings skills need to be developed. Bench-mark indicators for coordination and meetings are needed.
- Military – the military did not know who was who in the HA sector, and also they were not directed on what to do – that they would have done better had they been instructed (Claude said later that they will always do as they please). UN common services mechanisms not strong enough to deal with issue of dialogue with the military. Need to encourage a sector-wide discussion of what these should be and what they should do.

Workshop Comments / Questions on Coordination Study

- Local/national coordination versus HC/RC – what is the ideal and the balance? (Capacities and LRRD recommend being there as a support to national capacity.) Question UN lead in sectoral coordination, due to hierarchy within the system.
- ICVA tried to set up a coordination body for the NGOs, but there was no consensus so they failed. The issue is preparation for these types of mechanisms before a disaster, to have clarity on who will represent NGOs. INTERACTION is in ICVA but seemingly does not see itself as represented by ICVA.

- Staff quality is mentioned in several evaluations - skills, training recommended for coordination but also for longer-term view of LRRD, strengthening of local capacities, etc. Seniority is not competence (but the UN system seems to think it is). Continuity and turnover is an issue. Claude: we do not have a reservoir of these people; we do not seem to resolve it though it happens each time. No clear recommendation ... for example, when an evaluation complains about an operation (UNHCR) moves people from one operation to another to cover (stealing from Peter to pay Paul). Also staff poaching, undermined local organisations.
- The capacities study states that the internationals did not involve and communicate with and involve nationals and locals sufficiently in coordination. The int. community realised this but they did not know how. That is the point. They did not communicate sufficiently with the local population – they knew it should be done, but did not have the training and tools to do it.
- Applying standard one-size-fits all responses (e.g. from Africa) to middle income countries is questionable.
- Accreditation of NGOs/HA organisations was raised by Funding, assessment and coordination reports – so many (300 or 400) NGOs turned up at the emergency, many of poor quality. Should agencies be allowed in the country if they're not accredited? The governments should oversee this, but do they have the capacity and want to pass it on to OCHA. Claude says registration in the country is a different thing from (international) accreditation, and accreditation should be by cluster. Niels: Can we be more concrete? Can we say how we can do this? Stefan (WV) – ISO certification is an option (ISO9000). JC: MEDAIR is the only NGO that he knows that is ISO certified. Claude: you need accreditation by cluster/technical sector level. Having good accounting and management systems is not enough. You need assessment capacity to base your emergency response decisions on. Secondly, the standards you adhere to in your own country should be applied in emergencies as a minimum. Emery: Societe Generale de Surveillance (SGS) developed a framework for certification of NGOs but little or not applied, it seems.
- Susanne - OCHA are adding 26 admin staff to address the low OCHA admin capacity to support coordination.
- NGOs had so much money they did not need to coordinate, they felt.
- SPHERE – the agencies focussed on the technical standards, not the 'soft' principles aspect. Adherence to SPHERE was only lip-service. There is no set of coordination standard. JB said let's go back to the NGO (and others?) community to see whether we can develop such standards, bench-marks. JC clarifies that the 'common standards' in SPHERE (as opposed to the technical ones) are the ones not being applied but they include a coordination common standard.
- LRRD and coordination: **we differ in the reports re the definition of phases** (Maldives said relief ended end January ...). In Oct and Nov there was almost another emergency phase due to the transitional shelter crisis, so it's unclear. **JB was more positive about later linkages/LRRD because structures were put in place for coordination that went into the recovery phase. LRRD said early stage linkages were there.**
- JC re terminology: Beneficiaries, victim, affected as a term – we benefit and they don't says Claude (see listening project reference to how the international system spends so much on itself). And what is the definition of affected – we assess people without knowing whom we are assessing. And claim-holders: that is the term used in the capacities report? **The decision was made to use affected populations.**
- Stefan (WV) – can we make general recommendations for the future, as this is based on a unique situation (issues such as staff quality, etc)? Is the system able to cope even under 'normal' circumstances? JB – we want the synthesis to pick up on the issue of the capacity of the system, and is it able to cope. JC – we increase funds consistently even though it fluctuates in scale, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Kosovo, etc. The overall HA budget does not seem to go down ever, so it maybe a unique situation but there is a trend. JB – numbers of NGOs grew exponentially, now 100s of NGOs. There's also a trend towards fragmentation / multiplicity; it's not just about numbers.
- JT asks – is there a privatisation process, an oligopoly, shift in power from multi-laterals, and bi-laterals to NGOs, and privatised organisations. There is a large number of NGOs, JB says, but only 20% of NGOs control most of the resources ... the issue of independent organisations with mega budgets. This links to the accreditation issue ...

- Wayne – linked to this, what is the accountability framework when there is so much private money? Do we need new systems and models, NGOs are still working on old models.

Assessment team – Claude de Ville de Goyet

- **We had agreed as the TEC in previous meetings to be specific in naming agencies. We need to balance this in the reports, because few reports actually name agencies. It was agreed that the different studies should name them.**
- There are few contradictions between the reports – but one is that **JB said the international community should be praised for preventing epidemics and assessment says the opposite (JB not sure about this ...). They did not prevent disease / avoid epidemics, as this is a common myth with disasters ... see his report.**
- **UNDAC – we (ie, the assessment study) say it should be used for assessment and JB says coordination. We need to clarify this.**
- Gender – in terms of gender coverage in the reports: do we want to be politically correct or factually correct? All vulnerabilities should be addressed, not just gender ...
- **Coordination was more positive on technical standards; the assessment study believes only lip-service was paid to them (SPHERE). (Capacities says that the way the current humanitarian system operates the Sphere principles are impossible to operationalise.)**
- **Foreign Military (or is it UNDAC he says) – issue of dates of when they got to Banda Aceh. The first UNDAC report was on Dec. 30th ... they had been stuck in Jakarta. The studies differ on these dates. When was it?**
- Re the World Bank assessment – **Claude says that they did go to the field to do their damage assessment but JB says it was a desk exercise. There was a lot of desk analysis ... again, what to do about this difference?**
- **The Assessment team did not perceive that the HIC had edited reports, but JB said filtered ... The studies need to harmonise what they say on the HIC. And the JLC?**
- **The military did not use standard forms says JB, but Claude says all agencies used different forms.**
- Cash ... LRRD study is non-committal on its use (recognises both positives and negatives to its use). Gerry Adams said the jury is out in Indonesia as to whether it is culturally appropriate, but Claude pushes for it as an assessment mechanism. Emery says that it is not a matter of intermediaries and local structures. Claude says Brit Red Cross did a household-by-household survey and a list. The issue is cash grant and not cash for work which is different. Re the latter, JC says many problems re duration, etc. Emery says we do not have evidence to say good or bad. Synthesis study should take up the debate on this ... but LRRD doesn't look at cash grants (NA says people should decide and assessment is not needed.)
- **Difference in between reports in terms of saying there was too much money and sufficient money.** But surely 'excess funding' is relative to capacity rather than need? It's an issue of inefficiency rather than too much money. LRRD agrees that the disaster was not exceptional in terms of damage. They do not say there was too much money ...
- Cost – is the international system significantly or even hugely inefficient? We simply do not know and we are not accountable. Are military assets additional? If the military was not available, would that fund be available to the humanitarian sector / for civilian purpose?
- JC – there is a lump-sum line-item, from Congress for the military. JB – we could not even start to discuss military costs because all donors have different mechanisms. Niels – it is totally unclear, would money be spent on the military be given to HA organisations if the money had not been spent on the military (is it extra money?). Claude says that no matter what you tell the military they do what they want (in reply to JB, who said that the military said they would have acted differently if they had direction). Claude ... **you need to put both sides of the discussion in the report.** Moreover, the 'problems' with involvement of the military goes beyond them claiming to have little idea as to needs. For example, would they anyway have provided field hospitals?

- **In LRRD** – Claude disagrees with the emphasis in the LRRD study about the ‘poorest of the poor’ (the reported referred specifically to one context, and not generally, it seems). Predominantly, the poor are more vulnerable. We agree that it needs to be clarified. Yes rich suffered and this affected the recovery, but chronic poverty was important, as the report states, and was less well addressed than transient poverty. **It was agreed the study should clarify the statement.**
- **LRRD seems not to have agreed with the assessment report that the IFI’s recovery assessments were that good** ... we seem to agree that the assessments were better than the HA assessments, but were not necessarily used and that seems to be the criticism in the LRRD report. Claude says that the recovery assessment was not just IFI’s but also govt and NGOs. JC – was it a damage assessment or a needs assessment? JB – the lead time for the recovery assessment meant that it could not be relevant to decision-making (as with the HA assessment). Claude – there is a funding issue, more than just an assessment issue, regarding donors giving money without assessments and whether it is realistic in the early stage to get assessments.
- **Funding – you need advance funding for assessments. The donor response study misses this.** This recommendation can be linked to the CERF issue for assessment. Assessment agrees with the donor report on this.
- **The Flash Appeal cannot be assessment based, but rough-data based (see recommendation on remote sensing in the report ...) etc. and assessment need to discuss/clarify this with the coordination report ... how many days? 11 days is late for the Flash Appeal. JB – we thought it was successful, in that it was well timed, people and donors by then already knew.** Claude says that in normal disasters you need it earlier. RC and all exaggerate needs with the assumption that you will get only some of the money.
- If we want to be serious about assessment the H community has to be serious about providing the UN with resources to mobilise the capacity to do this – but should the UN take the lead? Surely it should work jointly with the Red Cross?

Workshop Comments / Questions on Assessment Study

- Wayne raised the issue of insurable costs, and how the insurance industry assesses damages. International insurance adjusters association estimated some 13Bn for tsunami related insurance costs (see a Reuters report; which is only part of damage – many were not insured). Also, watch out for the Katrina report on Wed. Feb. 15th.
- The IFIs/WB did a good assessment but also they have an advantage in that the situation does not change so much whereas the HA assessments do need to evolve.
- Claude - For assessment you need to improve the administrative support to the assessment process.
- JB – UNDAC is treated as just another NGO. It is a common-service, and it needs to have been treated as such, better than it was. Claude – you need a capacity to do an overall assessment, but that should be RC and UN together. UNDAC should not be driven by donors as a tool to put their people into teams just because they have 3 weeks training (Russians without any experience, mentioned). **Susanne says the study should stress this**, and the issue that there are no performance evaluations for UNDAC team members (but donor govts. disagree to have their staff assessed like this). Claude says you need to have people on retainers, to get the best you can find in the market and dispatch them immediately. What is needed is better and more targeted training for needs assessment.
- JC brings up the issue of accreditation of individual aid personnel, not just aid agencies ... like chartered accountants? **Susanne – we need better and more systematic training.**
- **Gerry Adams questions the statement that many NGOs (the majority?) did bad quality work. It needs to be supported better, as it is a controversial statement. Yes in the LRRD report they say that agencies promised too much, but they did not say that most were bad quality.** Stefan of World Vision said that ‘Harley for Aceh’ (Harley Davidson club?!) arrived to assist, and in Melbourne an organisation which had just been set up raised money and then created massive problems, schools without teachers, lacking understanding of Sharia Law, etc. Gerry says we need evidence for all this ... what percentage of agencies were sub-standard, etc. Claude says that psycho-social area is a major area for this, with agencies offering counselling with little or no cultural, linguistic and technical capacities. JB – says that the majority (80%) of money and work done was done by mature NGOs.

Claude – the problem is that the coordination system treats them as all of the same value, and wastes time and effort on trying to track and coordinate them all, as opposed to just the ones doing most work.

- For NGOs: the more established NGOs have to pick up where the 2nd and 3rd rate ones have packed up and gone home. They are not able to budget for this, though they've been able to do this due to the large amount of tsunami funding. What implications for the future? Could this be linked back to the donating public? To accountability? And, ultimately, to accreditation? But then the public, if they give to smaller more 'individual' NGOs may feel their money will be of more direct use.
- Fiona English – what about educating our populations re all these issues of how and to whom to give money. But people often want accountability so they want to give to people close to them, known locally to them and to ask them to monitor and report, rather than the large established agencies. Flint – says the big NGOs get the most money, so does the public really differentiate?
- Claude - the only capital sin (for donors) is if you do not spend your money. There is no performance measurement, and if you do badly you will still get money.
- Niels – can we make a strong case for accreditation or at least what to do about this issue of performance? The Synthesis needs to pick up on this. Claude – it needs to be accreditation by cluster/sector (not just overall, general agency accreditation). JC – you need to be able to differentiate between NGOs with capacity, etc. from those that do not have it. Niels – we need a higher level body or process. Others – ISO 9000 and/or SGS process ... and convince the national govts. re the need for registration/accreditation.
- Accreditation links to good governance and is not a simple solution. Add a statement on principle into GHD about accreditation? If in doubt, should donors fund nationally? How do we retain possible new – and good – players in the 'market' and discriminate between them and those big players already there?
- Donors should not fund low quality agencies, especially those of the same national base as the donor (flag waving ... donors scouring around for national NGOs, anyone to hold the flag). Yes donors need the tools and systems to accredit, but also a statement of principle.
- So three possible solutions re quality control:
 - Accreditation – ISO/SGS, a new body, whatever
 - Through Codes of Conduct type initiatives, to sign up to impact related evaluation, etc ... see Emery Brusset for this one ...
 - GHD statement of principle and development of tools and systems

Funding study – see the presentation in PowerPoint – Michael Flint

MF listed off a number of positive aspects of much money – giant lens, etc. Then the negatives:

- We need balance in criticism re generous funding, coordination, upwards accountability, etc. etc. The funding study does not disagree with these but are the studies being too negative? Should there be more balance?
- For other points – see his PPT. For example, despite the weaknesses, thanks to resources the response is effective, but not efficient. We need to agree on our conclusion re this or discuss it.
- Re impartiality – this is a grossly imbalanced, distorted response, both *within* the affected areas – assessment showing groups, regions, conflict areas (unlike WB), etc – and *between* tsunami areas and other crises. Also, staff were diverted from other emergencies to the tsunami.
- The massive funding generated overly upward accountability to donors and donor public, etc. **We (all TEC reports) need to sort out our conclusions re the lack of accountability.** Re upwards accountability to the donor public (funding report) - in fact, the general public are not so concerned about getting detailed reporting. Re downward, the LRRD and Capacities studies say little about downward accountability.
- Funding was 'supply-driven'. There were no mechanisms to guide funding, to allocate it across crises and organisations. But the big block funding to large organisations ossifies the system by just giving money to the big players.
- Re GHD and assessments: Claude notes the nuance that yes funding should be needs based *after* the first days, but before that it can only be based on quick rough-data gathering.

- Is it practical to pool funding, as the capacities study wanted, and how in practice would it work?
- Is this funding unique? Yes the tsunami was qualitatively and quantitatively different. Compare it with the DEC Pakistan Appeal, which was well funded but the appeal was just 15% of the response to the DEC tsunami appeal.
- Can we differentiate between this exceptional response and other less exceptional operations in our Synthesis recommendations? To what extent is the learning specific to the tsunami – ie, to well-funded, crowded emergencies – or more generally?

Workshop Comments / Questions on Assessment Study

- Re pooling of funds in the capacities study: their view is that there is a need to be more flexible, to have a mechanism to allocate funds across agencies, etc. It will be necessary to think through the allocation process, however ... JB – See the DEC re experiences of pooling. And UNICEF in the Maldives reallocated money to UNFPA. UNICEF had surplus funds there and could not spend them.
- MF – we need to examine this more. Do you create a pool initially, and then fund raise into it? Or do you post-factum create a fund and put already available money into it (or into joint programmes)?
- Was there too much money? Claude says the assumption that more money is always good is not true. The people of Aceh would have been better off with ½ the money and ½ the agencies in comparison with LRRD 'TMM' idea.
- WFP re food: Claude said WFP for political reasons bumped up the numbers of needy from their assessment of 400k to some 900k people (check figures?).
- Niels - The positive aspects were mainly in the funding of the operation. It was that it was flexible, untied, etc [to an extent] so we should show that. But we also need to bring out the critique from the LRRD, the capacities, studies etc. because the money was there to have done a good job so failures are important. **We do need to name organisations, we agreed that, so we need to go through our reports and do so ...**
- Stefan WV – out-sourcing and forging strategic partnerships with the private sector and other NGOs is an option. The funding study mentions the option of working in consortia.
- Rachel – we need to highlight good practice examples in the reports if we are to be serious about learning (a number of methodologies support this point).
- Rachel – The definition of effectiveness used in the donor response study – and therefore DAC – is too narrow. The Capacities study highlights the need to examine the definition of effectiveness in HA operations: are operations defined as effective in terms of *delivery* or *support*? And would accreditation favour delivery over support and thus ossify the system in the form it is now?
- Flint – no the funding study has not defined effectiveness very clearly. JC says effectiveness is whether avoidable deaths and suffering were met. In this way it helps to differentiate between initial and later phases. Claude – but the public gave for life-saving work, and that was all done before we (the international agencies) arrived.
- Major area of difference: **donor response differs to capacities in that DR sees initial phase as a success whereas capacities does not agree** – especially with regard to issues concerning sustainability. This brings a more development perspective in. Effectiveness doesn't consider issues of sustainability.
- Wayne – is there a capacity issue regarding money which left in bank accounts? The fear of and control against fraud and fear of bad audits put a brake on action, and decisions, because in the UNICEF case, this came out of their study. Auditors were happy to note that money was still in bank accounts and had not been subject to fraud (as opposed to having been used effectively to help people).
- JB – the IFRC had a 5 year plan within the first 2 weeks but this was exceptional; others did not.
- Wayne – Canadian CIDA auditors praised them for not having had fraud and that the money was in the bank. See what happens re this in the Katrina report too. Claude agrees and argues that staff are open to criticism either way (damned if you do and damned if you don't act).

- Gerry Adams – there is an assumption that more money is better. No one accepted that it would take 5 or even 10 years to rebuild.
- We need to make the point about so much still in the accounts, and the interest on that money (the RC will use interest earned for non-tsunami work). The Danes want the interest returned to them (DANIDA).

Various

- JC - Many agency reports are 'what we did' reports and not accountability reports (what was achieved, etc.). There is no market because agencies do not attack each other, or compare themselves, argue their value-added above other, etc.
- Fiona – we need to see if there is a mid-level type emergency scenario for future funding that we can advise on, even if the tsunami is an exceptional case.
- JB Competition is good among agencies – it provides choice. Claude – do people have more choice? Can they really choose? Did the people have the information to choose.
- Nanthi – and the overall pie is fixed, so it is not like a market that can adapt supply to demand.
- Cash is a mechanism to improve choice if goods and services to buy.
- What about vouchers – Tearfund in Sri Lanka tried some.

Capacities study – Nanthi in place of Arjuna

- Nanthi – cash is not a panacea, it requires specific conditions, training and safeguards from squandering, and should be provided in instalments.
- There are many similarities in the reports. The only key area (of difference) is the **initial phase where we differ from the opinion that it went well**. The GHD says that linkages should be made from the initial stage into later phases. In fact this did not happen well. So this requirement for the initial phase was not met.
- **Needs assessment is the term to be used for relief and damage assessment for longer-term (see P.29 line 1081 Capacities).**
- Coordination – JT points out the **contrast between the capacities and coordination reports, in that the latter basically takes international coordination as a given**. See the national coordination issue in chapter II of the capacities report. JB – said national coordination was equally important because many local NGOs were branches of National NGOs. JB – we recommend that local NGOs be admitted to the coordination mechanisms and that support be given to the authorities for coordination.
- The beneficiary surveys show that greatest satisfaction is in the first weeks and then it decreases. This is important, says Claude, because it points out that this is before the internationals arrived. (Just Sri Lanka?).
- **Re the 'window of opportunity' ... Claude says it does exist, but the issue is that it was not achieved. (re reference to the LRRD report which seems to doubt that the window exists).**
- If the international presence was negative in many aspects, should the Thailand and India cases not have shown a better performance (where the international involvement was more limited)? Thailand got 0.6% and India 16% of intl funding, Thailand had a pre-existing disaster system. It is not whether Thailand and India were better, but that the internationals in India played a positive role in seeing that vulnerable groups etc. were included. **JT asked if this can be reflected in the recommendations**. Claude asks whether people would have been better off if the intl invasion had happened in India – probably not, so ... the intls are not needed (as much as we think ...). Nanthi says and Claude agrees some presence and oversight by the international community is required. We agree it seems that where strong governments an India type scenario would have been desirable.
- Nanthi says that locals do not trust their own leaders. We the ints. go in with our own international standards. Capacities are overwhelmed, so there is a need for intl support. But is the way we aid 'crowding out' local capacities? Seemingly so. That is for him the issue. JT asks him to reflect these issues/their conclusions in the recommendations ... to deepen the analysis of the international role, presence and performance.

- JB – says that the original TEC TOR said we would not comment on the performance of national governments and therefore the coordination team didn't do so.

LRRD – Jerry Adams in place of Ian Christoplos

- **LRRD felt that gender was not given sufficient coverage in the coordination report. Is it that gender policies were not operationalised? The report does not link to wider livelihood frameworks.**
- In the capacities report, it says an overall 'technical approach' was followed ... what is meant by this?
- Coordination was more about activities than outcomes, it seems. NGOs did not need to coordinate due to a lot of private money. The LRRD team saw exceptions, like the SCF in Aceh in health care and this was because the right person with experience of health in Aceh was hired. Human resources issues like this are important, such as also the lack of local language skills, poaching of staff, etc ... Ian in his report wrote that this was capacity-breaking not capacity-building (capacity breaking for national organisations).
- On funding, the pressure to disburse was great. Agencies struggle to spend money in a short time.
- Many agencies moved out of their core competencies, especially into shelter, without necessarily having the skills.
- **'Building-back-better' – what does it mean? We differ in definitions.** To what standards? Is it risk prevention? Is it to SPHERE standards? Is it good reconstruction? Is it to beneficiary and cultural preferences? Etc.
- Re the media, we see little in the reports on their role and impact – agencies pushed for a positive image.
- M&E got little mention in the reports – many agencies were slow in developing systems, processes etc. for monitoring and evaluations, etc.
- **Re the 'Window of opportunity' – the difference between the LRRD and assessment report is that the LRRD report says it rarely is availed of, or happens. Claude points out that the LRRD report seems to question the concept. It does exist and is relevant ... and the real issue is that it is not availed of enough by agencies.**
- The distinction between complex and natural disasters is not useful ... this was a mixed scenario with both conflict and natural disaster aspects.

Workshop Comments / Questions on LRRD Study

- Re the LRRD report, JT says the LRRD report correctly notes that LRRD is essentially a political process and that the HA agencies do not have the skills set, etc. for this linking and recovery phase. **JT asks the LRRD team to spell out the conclusions they come to on this.** Others ask why we have different principles (re impartiality, political involvement, independence, etc.) in the development and HA fields ... they are all political. **JT asks the LRRD study to develop the point more ... is our 'non-political' approach unrealistic, especially in the LRRD phase?** The HA principles are founded on this.

Closing comments

- The synthesis report should be some 40 pages so as to get people to read it. And the exec summary should be separate (says Fiona). You need very clear conclusions and recommendations, up front, for the field people.
- Niels says a variety of products will be provided on a single CD, including the sub or country reports, etc. A discussion on report presentation and formatting etc. followed briefly.
- A request was made to make 'actionable' recommendations. But if teams cannot give clear tasks, etc. they should give at least examples of best practice.