


## Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC)

The International Community's Funding of the Tsunami Emergency and Relief



# Government Funding

United States

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## List of Abbreviations

<b>ANE:</b>	Asia and Near East Bureau
<b>AUDMMP:</b>	Asian Urban Disaster Mitigation Program
<b>DAC:</b>	Development Assistance Committee
<b>DARTS:</b>	Disaster Assessment Response Teams
<b>DOD:</b>	Department of Defence
<b>DRATS:</b>	Department of Defence Disaster Response Assistance Team
<b>DSCA:</b>	Defence Security Cooperation Agency
<b>FPP:</b>	Food for Peace
<b>ICRC:</b>	International Committee of Red Cross
<b>IDFA:</b>	International Disaster and Famine Assistance
<b>IFRC:</b>	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
<b>IRC:</b>	Indian Red Cross
<b>NOAA:</b>	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
<b>OCHA:</b>	United Nation's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>ODA:</b>	Official Development Assistance
<b>OECD:</b>	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>OFDA:</b>	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
<b>OHDACA:</b>	Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid
<b>PEER:</b>	Program for Enhancement of Emergency Response
<b>RMT:</b>	Response Management Teams
<b>USDA:</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>USDA:</b>	United States Department of Agriculture
<b>USG:</b>	The US Government
<b>VDAP:</b>	Volcano Disaster Assistance Program
<b>WFP:</b>	World Food Program

## **I. Introduction**

Provide a general description of the donor country's response, the actors involved and the funding mechanisms employed (i.e. whether several agencies are involved and if military assets have been deployed, etc.). The US Government (USG) response to the tsunami was a multi-agency effort led by USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). Within USAID, the Asia and Near East Bureau (ANE), the Food for Peace Program (FPP) and USAID Country Missions played important roles in the response and subsequent reconstruction. The Department of State addressed political issues and matters related to US citizens in the affected countries throughout the course of the response.

Other agencies also played key roles: The Department of Defense, for example, provided equipment and personnel to areas rendered inaccessible by the destruction. The US Department of Agriculture contributed P.L. 416 food for aid. The US Geological Survey, the US Forest Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration also contributed technical expertise to the overall USG response.

In general, the US used established operational and funding mechanisms for the response. The sheer scale of the disaster, however, required additional resources—financial and human—and eventually created some new partnerships and sectors of focus.

Internally, the USG response was highly coordinated. An Inter-Agency Standing Committee was created shortly after the tsunami and was responsible for coordinating the response. The Committee was comprised of Department of State, USAID, National Security Council, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Transportation, FEMA and the CIA.


Furthermore, USAID actively sought to bring in as wide a variety of people as possible both for the Disaster Assessment Response Teams (DARTs) and for the Response Management Teams (based in Washington). For example, DART and RMT members included a wide range of staff from within USAID, but also included members from other federal agencies such as the Department of Defense and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. DARTs and RMTs also included members from outside of the U.S. government including, the Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance and the University of Texas.

**Comment on the level of importance of humanitarian spending in donor state aid. Supply OECD DAC data on percentage of funding which donor usually devotes to humanitarian aid (i.e. whether it is above or below the 7% average).**

The US remains the world's largest provider of ODA—contributing about 24% of total global ODA flows. Despite the large volume of its contribution, the US does not meet the UN's ODA target of 0.7% of GNI. The US contribution of 0.16% is, with the exception of Italy at 0.15%, the least of all DAC member countries.

Within the larger ODA flows, the US is also by far the world's largest provider of humanitarian assistance. In 2003, the US provided 31% of total DAC humanitarian assistance—more than the

next six donors combined. Similarly, provisional data for 2004 indicate that the US contributed approximately \$ 2.26 billion in bilateral humanitarian assistance (about 27% of the total reported so far), roughly equalling the combined contribution of the next five largest donors.



Source: OECD/DAC

As the table below demonstrates, US net disbursements for humanitarian aid as a percentage of net bilateral disbursements fell in 2001 and 2002 before rising sharply in 2003. This spike was directly connected to US assistance to Afghanistan and Iraq. Iraq alone accounted for 17% of US bilateral humanitarian assistance in 2003.<sup>1</sup> Provisional data for 2004 indicate that humanitarian assistance has dropped below 2003 levels but remain higher than the previous two years.

<sup>1</sup> Global Humanitarian Assistance Update 2004-05. Development Initiatives. p. 7

**Table 1: Overview of US ODA and Humanitarian Aid (millions of USD)**

Year	ODA	Bilateral ODA	Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian aid/ Bilateral ODA (%)
2004 (provisional)	18618.14	14711.4	2260.3	15.36%
2003	16319.52	14593.54	2478.36	16.98%
2002	13533.6	10763.78	1406.83	13.07%
2001	11831.17	8575.38	1130.9	13.19%
2000	10552.06	7848.8	1234.73	15.73%

Source: OECD/DAC  
2003 prices

Present an overview on *how* donor(s) acted and reacted with their funding in this emergency and *why*.

**Overall USG funding:** On 11 May, 2005, in a supplemental appropriation, Congress approved the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for FY 2005. The table below provides a summary of how the funds were distributed. Note that the total for the first item, "Reimbursement and forward programs and operating expenses" is not an exact figure—rather; funds may be spent up to this amount. The remaining line items in Chapter 1 are mandated.

<b>Table 2: Summary of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for FY 2005</b>		
<b>Title IV- Indian Ocean Tsunami Relief</b>		
		<b>USD</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1 The Tsunami Recover and Reconstruction Fund</b>		<b>656,000,000</b>
USAID	Reimbursement and forward programs, operating expenses	574,500,000*
	Inspector General	1,000,000
	Environment	5,000,000
	Trafficking	1,500,000
	Micro enterprise	20,000,000
	Economic opportunities for women	10,000,000
	Disabilities	1,500,000
	Protection of Women and Children	12,500,000
State	Emergency support of US citizens	5,000,000
CDC	Avian Influenza Virus	15,000,000 <sup>2</sup>

\* Up to this amount

Child Survival Health (CSH)	Avian Influenza Virus	10,000,000 <sup>3</sup>
<b>Total</b>		<b>656,000,000</b>
<b>CHAPTER 2. Department of Defense. Military Operation and Maintenance</b>		
		<b>251,340,000</b>
DOD Navy	Operation and maintenance	124,100,000
DOD Marine Corps	Operation and maintenance	2,800,000
DOD Air Force	Operation and maintenance	30,000,000
DOD Defense-wide	Operation and maintenance	29,150,000
DOD Overseas Humanitarian Disaster And Civic Aid (OHDACA)		36,000,000
Defense Health Program		3,600,000
Homeland Coast Guard	Operating expenses	350,000
Interior USGS	Surveys, investigation and research--faster detection/notification	8,100,000
Commerce NOAA	Operation, research and facilities-expand/enhance US early warning	7,070,000
Commerce NOAA	Procurement, acquisition and construction--New deep ocean buoys	10,170,000
<b>Total</b>		<b>251,340,000</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		<b>907,340,000</b>

**Presidential Pledges:** USG public announcements regarding funding were as follows: Initially, President George W. Bush pledged \$15 million for the relief effort. But on 28 December, the USG increased this amount to \$35 million. Three days later, on 31 December, the President increased the pledge by \$315 for a total of \$350 million from the USG for tsunami relief.<sup>4</sup> Approximately one month later, on 9 February, the President announced that he would request \$950 million from Congress. In May, Congress approved \$907 million, of which \$656 fell under Chapter 1 (The Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund) of Title IV Indian Ocean Tsunami Relief. This entire amount, however, was not directly for the tsunami response as \$25,000,000 was earmarked for the Avian Bird Flu. Thus, the total under Chapter 1 of Title IV Indian Ocean Tsunami Relief which directly contributed the USG tsunami response is \$631,000,000.

<sup>2</sup> This amount will not be counted towards the total US contribution for tsunami relief and recovery

<sup>3</sup> This amount will not be counted towards the total US contribution for tsunami relief and recovery

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/12/20041231-1.html>

A number of variables play into the chronology of the USG pledging response. First, when the initial pledge was made the full extent of the disaster was not known. The Ambassador for Sri Lanka and the Maldives was the only one who issued a Disaster Declaration on 26 December. The US Ambassadors to India, Indonesia and Thailand issued Disaster Declarations the following day. Many of the areas affected by the tsunami were remote and accurate information about the impact took time to reach decision-makers.

Second, when the tsunami hit, OFDA had approximately \$35 million available for disaster response. The initial pledge represented approximately half of this amount. The second pledge made by the President represented 100% of OFDA's remaining operational funds for FY 2005. When it became clear that the scope of the disaster required resources far beyond what was immediately available to OFDA, other sources of funding were accessed. OFDA reprogrammed funds from its offices around the world in order to meet relief programming needs.

In sum, official pledging started with existing funds earmarked for international disasters and then moved to less accessible funds via either redirection of programme funds (USAID) or a Presidential drawdown (DOD)<sup>5</sup> and finally via a Congressional appropriation of supplemental funding on 11 May, 2005.

Third, international and domestic pressure played a role in influencing US funding for the tsunami. The pledge of \$15 million received widespread criticism both within the US and internationally. On 27 December, UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, made a public comment about stingy rich countries. While this statement was later reported as misrepresented, it may have contributed to the weight of broader international and domestic criticism of the US pledge.

**USAID/OFDA:** On 26 December, the day of the tsunami, the US Ambassador to Sri Lanka and the Maldives issued disaster declarations. USAID's Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) responded immediately, providing \$100,000 for Sri Lanka, \$100,000 for the Maldives and an additional \$200,000 through USAID Sri Lanka.

A Disaster Declaration allows the US Ambassador (or designated representative) to access up to \$50,000 Disaster Assistance Authority funds for relief efforts within the host country. These funds are often issued by OFDA within hours of receiving the Declaration. Based on information provided by the US Ambassador, OFDA doubled the funds available for immediate relief response.

On 27 December the US Ambassadors to India, Indonesia and Thailand issued Disaster Declarations. USAID/OFDA provided \$100,000 through USAID India to be divided between the

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<sup>5</sup> In the case of an unforeseen overseas emergency, two sections of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 empower the President to "draw down" articles and services from existing US government holdings, budgets or arsenals without awaiting congressional approval.

Prime Minister's Relief Fund and the Indian Red Cross; \$100,000 through USAID Indonesia for the Indonesian Red Cross and; \$100,000 to the US Embassy in Bangkok for the Thai Red Cross.

USAID/OFDA also responded by providing \$4 million to the 26 December IFRC preliminary funding appeal of \$6.6 million.

Within 24 hours of the first reports, USAID/OFDA had deployed members of its Disaster Assistance and Response Teams (DARTs)—including in-country USAID Mission staff seconded to the DART—to India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Thailand.

One reason DARTs were on-site so quickly was because the teams drew from established OFDA offices in Bangkok and Kathmandu. DARTs included water and sanitation experts as well as field and information officers. These teams are mandated not only to carry out initial assessments, but also to head up USG humanitarian responses. While the tsunami response was the largest humanitarian response to date, the DARTs followed existing procedure and provided assessments as well as leadership.

**USAID/FPP:** In addition to OFDA, the Food for Peace Program (P.L. 480) also gave assistance by providing 3000MT of emergency food assistance to WFP for Indonesia (valued at \$2.4 million) and an additional 8220MT to WFP for Sri Lanka (valued as \$10.6 million).

P.L. 480 Title II provides for the donation of US agricultural commodities by the US government to meet humanitarian food needs in foreign countries.

**USDA:** The US Department for Agriculture had limited involvement in the tsunami response but provided \$12 million of P.L. 416 commodities to Indonesia (9,417 MT) and Sri Lanka (5,583 MT).

#### **Department of Defense:**

Within the first 24 hours following the tsunamis, the Department of Defense requested information from the region's ambassadors and senior military officials to assess how military capacities could best be used. On the same day, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) authorised \$1.2 million for the initial relief response.<sup>6</sup> Within 48 hours damage assessment teams had been sent to Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand to assess the extent of the disaster as well as to provide water and medical aid.

By January 12, at the height of the operations, more than 15,000 US military personnel were involved in providing relief to the tsunami-affected region. Twenty five naval ships, one coast guard cutter, 58 helicopters and 43 planes were utilized.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Note: the \$1.2 million was not a part of the emergency drawdown funds later used by the DOD. The \$1.2 million was later reimbursed by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for FY 2005

<sup>7</sup> Going the Distance: The US Tsunami Relief Effort 2005 (<http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/tsunami>); interview with Lt. Col. Russ Bailey.

The DOD response to the tsunami was based primarily on a recognition that given the massive scale of the disaster, the US military was one of the few bodies that had the equipment—such as helicopters and airplanes—and personnel necessary to access the area and begin the relief response.

**Comment possible limitations encountered in the evaluation and account for particularities.**

The objective of this report is to present an overview of USG funding for the tsunami as well as to examine the USG response with regards to principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship. Materials for this report were collected via internet—using primarily USG, OECD and UN websites—and through email/personal interviews with USAID and DOD staff.

The primary limitation of this evaluation was time. Data collection, analysis and write-up took place within four weeks. Access to much of the information was dependent on responses from people within the relevant agencies. While many available USAID staff were helpful and willing to contribute to this evaluation, some of the key people involved in the tsunami response were unavailable due to commitments in connection with crises in Niger, Darfur, the end of the US Fiscal Year, Pakistan, Guatemala and the Hurricane Katrina response, where for the first time, OFDA has been involved with a domestic disaster. As a result, there are still gaps in the information.

Financial information from the Department of Defense was not available for this report. This omission means that much of the report focuses on USAID alone. Since USAID is the primary humanitarian arm of the USG, the report still provides a fairly accurate overview of the humanitarian response. However, in the USG tsunami response, the DOD played a major role in the humanitarian response and the lack of information leaves the overall picture of the USG response incomplete.

As a result of delays and incomplete information, analysis of the data was limited.

**II. Overall Allocation and Disbursement**  
**Mapping the volume and distribution**

USAID’s Tsunami Fact Sheet #39 (available on the website) provides a detailed breakdown of its funding by implementing actor (see Annex 1). The total amount listed in Annex 1 is for USG humanitarian assistance only and provides a total of \$113,800,957. The Fact Sheet also includes some costs of rehabilitation.

**Table 3: Tsunami Fact Sheet #39 Overview of USG Humanitarian Funding**

Total USAID/OFDA Humanitarian Assistance Committed	83,173,613
Total USAID/FFP Humanitarian Assistance Committed	13,054,400
Total USAID/ANE Humanitarian Assistance Committed	5,372,944

Total USAID/ANE Rehabilitation/Reconstruction Assistance Committed	18,622,969
Total USDA Humanitarian Assistance Committed (FS39 July 7)	12,000,000
Total State/PRM Humanitarian Assistance Committed (FS39 July 7)	200,000
Total USG Humanitarian Assistance Committed (FS39 July 7)*	132,423,926
<b>Total USG Humanitarian Assistance Committed (minus rehab/recovery)</b>	<b>113,800,957</b>

\*does not include DOD assistance

Source: USAID Tsunami Fact Sheet #39

While the Tsunami Fact Sheet provides considerable detail on the humanitarian front, information about rehabilitation is more difficult to track at the same level of detail. This may be due in part to the fact that information on the rehabilitation phase is managed by USAID country missions and thus is far more decentralized.

The table below provides information on USAID funding by country. It is important to note that the humanitarian aid information listed below is different from that recorded by the Tsunami Fact Sheet—which provides a breakdown of \$113,800,957 spent on the relief response. The variation may be due to the fact that unlike the table below, the Fact Sheet includes FPP food aid (\$13,054,400) and other USG agency contributions such as USDA, in-kind contributions and reprogrammed funds. While the table below does not cover the entire USG response, it provides a useful overview of how funds managed by USAID were distributed between countries. By way of comparison, a table detailing the Fact Sheet breakdown of the humanitarian response is provided below.

As would be expected given the levels of destruction, Sri Lanka and Indonesia both received a significantly larger amount of funding than the other countries. Sri Lanka received the most funds in the relief response at 42.6%, but received a far small share of the reconstruction funds at 22%. Conversely, Indonesia received almost 31% of the relief funds and about 77% of the reconstruction funds. The focus of these two countries is highlighted in percentage of total assistance each received—Indonesia about 70% and Sri Lanka 22%. 92% of all relief and reconstruction commitments went to Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

Country	Humanitarian Aid			Reconstruction			Total	
	Committed	Disbursed	Committed as a percent of total committed	Committed	Disbursed	Committed as a percent of total committed	Amount	%
India	4,290,800	1,254,200	5.02%	12,691,800	608,100	2.797%	16,982,600	3.15%

\* Note: Figures do not include funds for Trade and Development Agency (TDA), Department of State or debt relief

Indonesia	26,478,200	14,002,900	30.97%	350,480,800	807,100	77.24%	376,959,000	69.90%
Malaysia	50,000	0	0.06%	0	0		50,000	0.01%
Maldives	1,378,000	782,300	1.61%	0	0		1,378,000	0.26%
Seychelles	150,000	0	0.18%	0	0		150,000	0.03%
Somalia	833,200	387,900	0.97%	0	0		833,200	0.15%
Sri Lanka	36,440,100	6,418,500	42.62%	82,600,900	1,272,400	18.20%	119,041,000	22.07%
Thailand	186,400	162,000	0.22%	0	0		186,400	0.03%
Regional	15,701,800	3,605,200	18.36%	6,373,800	22,500	1.40%	22,075,600	4.09%
AID/W and non- distributed funds	0	0	0.00%	1,608,200	665,900	0.35%	1,608,200	0.30%
<b>Total</b>	<b>85,508,500</b>	<b>26,613,000</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>453,755,500</b>	<b>3,376,000</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>539,264,000</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: USAID's Tsunami Relief and Reconstruction Report Office of the Chief Financial Officer (as of 31 August, 2005)

Note: Does not include FPP \$12.2 million in food aid commodities and associated transportation

<b>Table 4b Total USG funding committed for tsunami humanitarian response</b>	
Country	USD
India	4,279,875
Indonesia	42,089,816
Malaysia	50,000
Maldives	1,378,000
Region	13,279,074
Seychelles	150,000
Somalia	1,033,171
Sri Lanka	51,222,150
Thailand	318,871
<b>Total</b>	<b>113,800,957</b>

Source: USAID/OFDA Tsunami Fact Sheet #39

Includes FPP \$13.05 million

however, but more a matter of timing. Redirected funds were reimbursed, but some programmes may have been delayed by a month or two.

Funding was modified across the board. Regional teams prioritized which activities could or could not be delayed and submitted appropriate funding recommendations. A pipeline analysis was conducted for all on-going programs to determine where it was possible to delay funding

**Have committed funds increased overall spending? (i.e. were new funds allocated or was the emergency relief funding reallocated from other budget lines?). If other budget lines were affected, which?** Overall spending on humanitarian aid increased through a supplemental appropriation passed by Congress on 11 March, 2005.

At the time of the tsunami, OFDA had about \$35 million immediately available. These funds were "no-year" funds meaning that if they are not used within the fiscal year, they rollover to the following year.

Other budget lines were affected in that relief programming was initially funded by delaying some programme funds and redirecting them to the tsunami response. The impact was not financial,

until additional resources were made available. OFDA responded to new disaster declarations with existing and available resources.

OFDA spent \$83,173,613 on the tsunami humanitarian response—including the \$35 million it originally had available—and was reimbursed approximately 97% of this by the end of FY 2005 for obligations made before 11 May (the date of the appropriation).

Similarly, needs of the tsunami response far outweighed the humanitarian aid resources immediately available to the Department of Defense through its Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) fund. On 4 January, President Bush sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense stating that it was in the national interest of the United States to drawdown articles and services from the inventory and resources of the Department of Defense—to the tune of \$65 million—for the purpose of providing international disaster relief assistance to countries affected by the Asian tsunami.<sup>8</sup> The Department of Defense spend considerably more than this—an estimated \$226 million, which was eventually reimbursed by Chapter 2, Title IV of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for FY 2005 (see p. 4).

**What was the immediate impact on other planned interventions? Was all funding provided in the form of grants and untied aid?** Excluding DOD funds, USG funding was divided as follows: About 24% of all contributions were in-kind while 76% were either grants or funds transfers within the USG (or unspecified). Excluding USG agencies and unspecified line items, about 68% of the humanitarian aid contribution was in the form of grants and about 22% of the total was in-kind

While all US grant proposal include clauses pertaining to state of origin procurement and services, these clauses are often waived in the case of rapid onset disasters using a Notwithstanding Authority. In the case of the tsunami humanitarian response, these clauses were waived.

As the response has moved on to reconstruction, however, normal procedures and processes are required and the Notwithstanding Authority no longer applies. One exception was in an infrastructure reconstruction project in Sri Lanka, where USAID “untied” the construction contract.

**Breakdown by implementing actor for relief phase (see Annex 1)**

Including goods in kind and DOD funds, INGOs and NGOs received the largest share of USG humanitarian funding (38.33%). The UN received about 31.27% as most funding to the UN was in the form of emergency food assistance for WFP (valued at approximately \$25 million). Private companies received about the same as the IFRC/ICRC

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<sup>8</sup> [www.whitehouse.gov](http://www.whitehouse.gov). Presidential Determination 2005-16

<b>Table 5a Breakdown of Humanitarian aid by implementer including goods in kind</b>		
NGOS	43,860,955	38.54%
UN	35,581,869	31.27%
Intergovt	3,558,452	3.13%
IFRC/ICRC	10,287,936	9.04%
USG	3,681,286	3.23%
Nat'l govt	75,000	0.07%
Private	10,000,000	8.79%
Unspecified	6,755,459	5.94%
<b>Total</b>	<b>113,800,957</b>	<b>100.00%</b>
Source: USAID Tsunami Fact Sheet #39		

<b>Table 5b Breakdown of Humanitarian aid by implementer excluding goods in kind</b>		
NGOS	43,860,955	50.69%
UN	10,432,869	12.06%
Intergovt	3,558,452	4.11%
IFRC/ICRC	9,832,231	11.36%
USG	3,102,286	3.59%
Nat'l govt	75,000	0.09%
Private	10,000,000	11.56%
Unspecified	5,669,797	6.55%
<b>Total</b>	<b>86,531,590</b>	<b>100.00%</b>
Source: USAID Tsunami Fact Sheet #39		

Data for USG funding for the entire humanitarian response were difficult to access, but given that OFDA is the US Government's primary humanitarian arm, examining OFDA funding for previous years provides a fairly good picture of how USG funds (excluding the DOD) were distributed.

The OFDA Annual Report 2004 shows that in FY 2004, 60% of its funding for disaster response was disbursed NGOs, 21% to the UN, 17% to "other" and 2% to International Organisations. Similarly, the 2003 Annual Report indicates states that in FY 2003 66% of OFDA's funding went to NGOs, 15% to the UN, 17% to "other" and 2% to International Organisations.<sup>9</sup>

The distribution of the tsunami response, at least as far as NGOs, the UN and the IFRC/ICRC are concerned, was somewhat unusual. Including goods-in-kind (primarily two large food aid donations to WFP), the UN received just under one third of total tsunami humanitarian funding. The IFRC/ICRC also received much more than the usual 2% (under "International Organisations" in the Annual Reports). NGO's share of the funds was actually lower than the annual averages. This shift in the trend may well have been due to the fact that within two

<sup>9</sup> OFDA Annual Report 2003. p.14; OFDA Annual Report 2004. p. 5.

weeks of the disaster it became clear that NGOs had access to greater sums of private funding than could be provided by official donors. The influx of private funds not only swayed the DARTs' response of providing fewer and smaller grants, but also may have controlled the lower number of NGO requests for funding.

**What role, if any, did the Flash Appeal and the FTS play in terms of the donor funding?** The US contributed \$48 million to the tsunami Flash Appeal—4.5% of the grand total. The bulk of US funding for the tsunami fell outside of the appeals process.<sup>10</sup>

**Has there been a concentration of funds in a few organizations/institutions or have funds been distributed more widely? (How does this compare with percentages of allocations committed in other disasters?)** Funding for the tsunami was spread out between more than 50 organisations including local NGOs, INGOs, private companies, UN organisations, the IFRC/ICRC and other USG agencies. The single largest contribution was emergency food assistance to WFP for Sri Lanka. This was followed by a grant to a private company for livelihoods activities.

**Did funds flow to private companies for implementation purposes?** The bulk of USG funding went to NGOs; however some did go to private companies. Notably, IBM received funds for IT support and Nathan Associates for developing micro-enterprise and livelihoods activities.

**Were military assets employed?**

The large scale involvement of the US military was one of the defining characteristics of the USG emergency relief response to the tsunami. An estimated \$28.3 billion worth of capital assets were utilized by the military at the height of operations. This included naval ships, helicopters and both transport and reconnaissance planes. An estimated \$226 million was spent by the Department of Defense for its humanitarian response to the tsunami.<sup>11</sup>

Part of the DOD funding for the tsunami response was taken from its Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) fund. OHDACA funds are used for the DOD's Humanitarian Assistance Program, the Humanitarian Mine Action Program and the Foreign Disaster Relief and Emergency Response. OHDACA programmes support two goals: First to maintain an overseas presence to promote stability in regions of tension and second, for US forces to respond effectively to disasters.

In addition to OHDACA resources, the President of the United States has the authority to directly draw down on DOD resources in case of a disaster. Much of the DOD funding for the tsunami response came from a Presidential draw down.

**Were any donations in kind? If so, what types of goods were provided?**

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<sup>10</sup> OCHA FTS. <http://ocha.unog.ch/fts>

<sup>11</sup> Rhoda Margesson. CRS Report for Congress RL32715. p. 10. Note: It is not certain if the DOD actually spent this amount. The appropriation allows for reimbursement up to this amount.

In addition to about \$25 million worth of emergency food assistance, the USG provided a number of goods in kind (equalling more than \$1.6 million), which included jerry cans, bladders, plastic sheeting, hygiene kits, kitchen sets and mosquito nets.

<b>Table 6. USG Goods in Kind (excluding DOD)</b>			
<b>Organization</b>	<b>Type of goods</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Value (USD)</b>
PMI (Indonesian Red Cross)	Jerry cans, bladders, miscellaneous	Indonesia,	99,050
IFRC	Jerry cans, blankets, bladders,	Sri Lanka	750,699
UNICEF	Jerry cans, bladders, hygiene kits	Maldives	94,600
US Embassy JTF	Jerry cans, hygiene kits	Thailand	196,631
IRC/IOM	Kitchen sets, mosquito nets	Indonesia	500,432
US Navy	Miscellaneous	Sri Lanka	5,225
WFP	P.L. 416 (b) Title 1 emergency food assistance	Indonesia	7,533,600
WFP	P.L. 480 Title II emergency food assistance	Sri Lanka	10,615,840
WFP	P.L. 416 (b) Title I emergency food assistance	Sri Lanka	4,466,400
WFP	P.L. 480 Title II emergency food assistance	Indonesia	2,438,560
<b>Total</b>			<b>26,601,987</b>
Source: OFDA Tsunami Logistics Sheet; USAID Fact Sheet #39			

### **What implementation mechanisms were foreseen and utilized?**

OFDA has a number of existing implementation mechanisms, all of which were utilized in the tsunami response.

- *Send Disaster Assessment Response Teams.* These are usually only used in the case of a major disaster. Within 24 hours, OFDA had sent DARTs to India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Due to the magnitude of the disaster, and because it was spread across different countries, the DARTs to these four countries came under a regional DART leader. While the initial role of a DART is to assess the situation, if necessary—as in the case of the tsunami—these teams will stay on and lead the USG relief response.
- *Directly provide relief commodities from the warehouses.* Pre-positioned food was, for example, taken from stocks based in Dubai.
- *Send funds to the embassy or USAID mission* for local procurement of relief commodities by operations on the ground. Funds
- *Award grants to NGOs or international organizations* (the majority of the dollar amount for the tsunami went to this).
- *Draw on resources of other government agencies.* The Department of Defense was a critical actor in the initial relief response. Clearly established protocol establishes USAID/OFDA as the lead in any overseas USG humanitarian response. US military resources played a supporting role. It should be noted that while OFDA had the lead, decisions which involved other agencies were taken jointly. OFDA provided direction for activities (and related funds) but did not have line authority over other agencies. As outlined below, other US agencies

involved in the tsunami response included USGS, NOAA and the US Forest Service. Input from these agencies, however, was not significant in the humanitarian response, but in the reconstruction phase.

**Have different partnerships developed?** Two different partnerships grew to significance during the course of the tsunami response: Partnerships with other branches of the US Government and; partnerships with private corporations.

While the partnership with the US military was not a new phenomenon, within the tsunami response coordination with the US military reached a new levels of important. The value of military equipment—which could effectively be used in the humanitarian response—was highlighted during the tsunami. For example, helicopters and military transport planes played an invaluable role in reaching areas inaccessible by road.

In addition to improved coordination with the DOD partnerships with other USG Agencies, such as the US Forest Service, USGS and NOAA also took on new levels of importance during the reconstruction phase. These agencies have been particularly important in providing technical expertise in the creation of early warning systems.

The second non-traditional partnership developed directly due to the outpouring of private funds in response to the tsunami and as such, is unique to this disaster: Partnership with the private sector. While the USG has partnered with private corporations in the past, never before has the partnership been so significant in terms of funding. Private corporations have provided approximately \$17 million for reconstruction activities. USAID matches the donation and programmes are jointly designed with the corporation.

#### **Sector Allocations and Geographic Focus by Donor and Budget**

**Data should be provided for humanitarian aid.** Note that a sectoral breakdown for the entire USG response, including the DOD, was unavailable while this report was being written.

**To the sectors defined by OCHA, “logistics” has been added to account for military assets, transportation and emergency teams, etc.**

While a sectoral breakdown of the response was not available for the entire USG response, OFDA’s humanitarian aid response by sector is summarised in the table below. Since OFDA provided 73% of the USG humanitarian aid response (outside of expenditures incurred by the Department of Defense) the chart below provides a sense of the overall response. Note that OCHA sectoral categories are highlighted.

Of the categories outlined by OCHA, Coordination received 0.67% of total OFDA funding, Food and agriculture received 1.5%, Health received 13.87%, Mitigation received 0.02%, Rehabilitation received 16.94%, Shelter received 13.95% and Water and sanitation received

20.18%. In total, these sectors received 67.17% of total OFDA funding for the tsunami humanitarian response.

	Asia	India	Indonesia	Malaysia	Maldives	Seychelles	Somalia	Sri Lanka	Thailand	Total
Admin Support	225,894	0	100,000	0	18,920	0		260,000	150,000	754,814
Airlift of relief commodities	1,232,000	0	481,103	0	68,400	0		159,526		1,941,029
<b>Coordination</b>	87,074	0	250,000	0	75,675	0	141,369	0	0	554,118
Disaster response*	0	0	100,299	0	0	0	441,802	554,363	100,000	1,196,464
<b>Food security/ agriculture</b>	0	350,112	942,502							1,292,614
<b>Health</b>	27,667	450,000	8,784,764		325,000		250,000	1,653,697	23,871	11,514,999
Income generation	0	206,325	1,088,204			100,000		237,770		1,632,299
<b>Mitigation</b>	0	0	0		15,000					15,000
Nutrition	0	0	0		225,000					225,000
<b>Rehabilitation</b>		240,295	1,321,771					12,500,000		14,062,066
Relief Commodities	11,000,515	100,000	5,649,467	50,000	94,600	50,000		2,255,302		19,199,884
Search and Rescue	0	0	325,000					697,152		1,022,152
<b>Shelter</b>	0	1,059,992	1,725,000					8,795,011		11,580,003
Staff enhancement	416,185	0	500					247,761		664,446
Travel	270,451	37,100	108,500					160,500	45,000	621,551
<b>Water and Sanitation</b>	19,288	1,843,276	4,981,433		555,405			9,354,980		16,754,382
<b>Total</b>	<b>13,279,074</b>	<b>4,287,100</b>	<b>25,858,543</b>	<b>50,000</b>	<b>1,378,000</b>	<b>150,000</b>	<b>833,171</b>	<b>36,876,062</b>	<b>318,871</b>	<b>83,030,821</b>

\*A definition for "Disaster Response" outside of the other sectors in the table was not available

### Have donor institutions funded non-traditional areas and sectors?

The scale of the disaster, as well as the multi-country impact meant that every sector required considerable assistance. Two sectors were funded far beyond the scope of OFDA's traditional relief patterns: Livelihoods/income generation and psychosocial. While both of sectors had been funded in the past, they received a much higher proportion of funding in the tsunami response than previous responses.

A few different factors came to light in the DARTs' analysis and contributed to the focus on livelihoods: Communities needed to be rebuilt and people had lost all means of generating income. Livelihood projects would encourage populations to actively take part in the rebuilding process and would inject much-needed cash into the communities to give people purchasing

power. Furthermore, affected countries were left with significant assets upon which impacted communities could draw, making the restoration of purchasing power a key activity.

Finally, livelihoods were also seen as a way to address the terrible psychosocial toll the tsunami had taken on the populations by providing people with activities that looked towards a positive future. Particular focus was placed on income generation activities in India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

The second area of non-traditional focus was psychosocial health. In the initial assessments, the teams emphasized high levels of psychological trauma they were seeing in the field. OFDA responded by requesting a psychosocial technical expert to be on the Response Management Team in Washington DC. The expert provided psychosocial guidelines for the response—including ways of integrating psychosocial approaches into the humanitarian response<sup>12</sup>—provided recommendations for short-term and mid-term activities and played a key role in vetting proposals for funding.

Information should be provided on whether the donor regularly funds humanitarian aid interventions in the countries that were affected by the tsunami and whether efforts in disaster preparedness and mitigation have been engaged in the past.

Prior to the tsunami, the USG provided humanitarian aid in all of the countries that were impacted by the tsunamis in December 2004. Since 1995, USAID/OFDA has provided approximately \$42.1 million for ongoing preparedness and mitigation projects throughout the region. As of July 2005 USAID/OFDA provided more than \$3 million for disaster preparedness and mitigation projects in the Asia-Pacific region for FY 2005.<sup>13</sup> The USG is also contributing \$16.6 million dollars to building tsunami disaster response and early warning capabilities in the region.<sup>14</sup>

The regional assistance has been given to a number of programmes including the Asian Urban Disaster Mitigation Program (AUDMP) through the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre; Program for the Enhancement of Emergency Response (PEER); South Pacific Disaster Training Program; Asia Flood Network; Technical Assistance for Hydro meteorological Disasters and USGS's Volcano Disaster Assistance Program (VDAP). These regional programmes cover a wide range of activities including: Promoting successful urban preparedness measures; sharing of disaster-related information; the development of management courses; training of trainers; assisting local disaster management agencies in conducting training in medical first response, collapsed structure search and rescue and hospital preparedness; capacity building for local and national disaster management agencies

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<sup>12</sup> Cripe, Lynn. "Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunamis Concept Paper: Psychosocial Programming" Jan 2005.

<sup>13</sup> USAID/OFDA Asia disaster preparedness and mitigation programs fact sheet #1 (FY 2005).

[[www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/humanitarian\\_assistance/disaster\\_assistance](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance)]

<sup>14</sup> <http://usinfo.state.gov>

The regional disaster preparedness and mitigation programmes have been developed in Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Kiribati, Laos, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Nepal, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Samoa, Sri Lanka, the Solomon Islands, Thailand, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. The Asia-Pacific countries impacted by the tsunami have benefited from ongoing disaster preparedness and mitigation programmes funded by the USG regional programmes.

In addition to the regional programs, OFDA supports sub-regional programmes and national programmes in the Asia-Pacific region. In general the programmes focus on preparedness for natural disasters, although one programme in the Philippines focuses on preparedness for conflict.

Outside of the Asia-Pacific region, the US Government has had a presence in Somalia since 1990. It is currently the largest bilateral donor and since 1990 has provided more than \$476 million to Somalia for humanitarian assistance activities.<sup>15</sup>

### **III. Good Humanitarian Donorship**

#### **Provide an assessment of donor funding policy on the basis of Humanitarian Donorship Principles and Good Practice.**

In general, USAID's funding policy for the tsunami appears to be based on principles of Humanitarian Donorship Principles and Good Practice. Funding was based on needs assessments and on beneficiary input. Sectoral and geographic coverage was specifically linked to needs on the ground.

The choice of implementing partners also reflects a commitment to meeting the needs of beneficiaries—in-country experience and technical expertise were important criteria in deciding which organisations would be funded.

One area which could be strengthened is that while the policies and guidelines underpinning the response were implicitly based around various international standards—such as the IASC guidelines, RC Code of Conduct and IDP Guiding Principles, international humanitarian law etc—there appears to be a noticeable lack of explicit mention of these standards. Standards that are mentioned (such as Sphere) are strongly recommended, but not required.

USAID's response in the tsunami is in line with its own commitment to supporting the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative. One demonstration of its commitment is that it is a cosponsor for a pilot GHDI in the Democratic Republic of Congo

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<sup>15</sup> [http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia\\_near\\_east/tsunami/countries/so.html](http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/tsunami/countries/so.html)

Internally, USAID is actively engaged in a learning process. For example, in 2003, USAID established the Humanitarian Protection Team whose focus is to increase the protection of human rights during disasters and complex emergencies.

## 1. Humanitarian principles and objectives

**Was funding guided by principles of *humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence*? Was funding directed towards easing human suffering and provided in a way that did not favour one of the sides in conflict? (Related to point 3).**

USAID'S mission is: "The Agency works to support long term and equitable economic growth and to advance US foreign policy objectives by supporting: Economic growth, agricultural and trade; global health; democracy, conflict prevention; and humanitarian assistance"<sup>16</sup>

The Agency's mission does not meet the principles of neutrality, impartiality or independence as it is directly linked to U.S foreign policy objectives.

As the primary humanitarian arm of USAID, OFDA's mandate to "save lives, reduce human suffering and alleviate the economic impact of disasters", is founded on the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence.

In order for OFDA to respond to a disaster, the U.S. Ambassador (or other designated representative) of the affected country must issue a Disaster Declaration, for which three criteria are necessary: First, the disaster has to be beyond the capacity of the affected country to adequately respond themselves. Second, the affected country must either formally request assistance or provide a clear indication that it welcomes USG assistance. Third, it must be within the USG's interest to respond.

The final criterion raises questions about OFDA's neutrality, impartiality and independence. However, in practice, it is not clear that political concerns have swayed OFDA against responding to a disaster. OFDA has responded to every situation where USG humanitarian assistance has been requested. In 2004, for example, OFDA responded to 68 disasters around the world.

Once OFDA responds, its involvement is directed specifically by the needs of the affected communities and USG resources are intended to reduce human suffering based on need. OFDA's Guidelines for Proposals and Reporting state that "OFDA's goal for responding to disasters is to meet the critical needs of targeted, vulnerable populations using best practices and techniques in a timely and effective manner."<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)

<sup>17</sup> USAID/OFDA Guidelines for Proposals and Reporting. Nov 2004 p. 17

Within this context, funding for the tsunami was guided by the principles of GHD. Funding was directed to address the needs of the impacted population in the most efficient and effective way possible as demonstrated by OFDA's constant reference to field assessments, its bottom-up approach and its funding of non-traditional sectors.

USAID has recently adopted a Conflict Policy, which will ensure that conflict assessments are built into its programmes. The Policy will also increase sensitivities regarding how USAID relates to tensions within the host country.<sup>18</sup>

**How were international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights considered in both the strategy and funding of donors in response to the tsunami?** Humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights were considered implicitly in the USG strategy and funding response to the tsunami. The focus on protection of vulnerable groups as a mandated line item in funding is one example of this.

**What efforts have been engaged in promoting the use of IASC guidelines, RC Code of Conduct and IDP Guiding Principles?** USAID has put into place an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Policy in order to ensure that the Agency explicitly focuses on the particular needs of IDPs. USAID is also working with other donors and UN agencies to create standards for the protection of individuals during crises. These efforts are informed by Common Approach to IDPs guidelines for *Good Humanitarian Donorship*. USAID has also created a new Humanitarian Protection Unit to actively advocate for the protection of at-risk individuals.

**Did the donor uphold the principles of humanitarian aid in responding to the tsunami disaster? Was funding explicitly and exclusively channelled only to those institutions that claim to adhere to this code of conduct and aspire to Sphere Minimum Standards in Disaster Response? (Related to needs based funding and choice of independent implementing channels, etc.).**

OFDA's Guidelines for Proposals and Reporting make general reference to international standards by stating *USAID/OFDA supports the use of international standards in all disaster response programs. While recognizing that reaching the minimum standards (such as those detailed in the Sphere Handbook) is not always possible, USAID/OFDA encourages their use as a guideline when designing disaster response and mitigation activities.*<sup>19</sup> Explicit reference is made only to Sphere standards within the text, but no other specific references are made to other international standards except in the references section, where the Geneva Convention is mentioned.

Many of the specific guidelines within the document, however, uphold the Red Cross Code of Conduct, specifically the Principle Commitments of respecting culture and custom; building on local capacities; involving beneficiaries in the management of relief aid and; striving to reduce future vulnerabilities while meeting basic needs.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> [www.usaid.gov/policy](http://www.usaid.gov/policy)

<sup>19</sup> USAID/OFDA. Guidelines for Proposals and Reporting. Nov 2004. p.12

<sup>20</sup> USAID/OFDA. Guidelines for Proposals and Reporting. Nov 2004. pp 11-12

Just under one third of the non-UN, non-governmental organisations funded for the tsunami response were signatories of the Red Cross Code of Conduct. While USAID/OFDA prefers to direct funding towards organisations that adhere to international codes, during a disaster preference is given to organisations that have a history within the impacted country, a reputation for competence and ideally, previous partnership with OFDA.

## 2. Flexibility and timeliness

**How flexible and timely was funding? Can intended funding be reallocated to another crisis? What mechanisms does the donor have to mobilize funds?**

**The time span between pledge and disbursement (maximum 6 week target suggested by June 2005 HRR).** It is difficult to track USG humanitarian response funds spent within the first six weeks for a few different reasons: First, the \$350 million pledge was not specific in how the funds would be divided between USG departments, relief sectors or geographic areas. Second, when the President announced he would seek additional funds, the \$350 million was subsumed into the new total amount, which included reconstruction funds, making tracking difficult. Third, while DOD operations were complete in about six weeks, DOD financial information is missing and it is unclear how much was spent on the relief effort. While Congress has agreed to reimburse the DOD for up to \$226 million, it is not certain if the DOD actually spent this much on the response. Finally, not all of the humanitarian assistance listed in the table below was disbursed within the first six weeks of the response. Due to these unknowns, it is difficult to determine the timeliness of the disbursement. Given the information above, it appears likely that much, but not all of the original pledge of \$350 million was disbursed within the six week target.

1 October, humanitarian spending for the USG without the DOD was as follows:

<b>Total USG Humanitarian and Recovery Assistance</b>	
Pledged	350,000,000
Total USAID/OFDA Humanitarian Assistance Committed	83,173,613
Total USAID/FFP Humanitarian Assistance Committed	13,054,400
Total USAID/ANE Humanitarian Assistance Committed	5,372,944
Total USDA Humanitarian Assistance Committed	12,000,000
Total State/PRM Humanitarian Assistance Committed	200,000
<b>Total USG Humanitarian Assistance Committed</b>	<b>113,800,957</b>

Source: [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov) Tsunami Fact Sheet #39

While it is unclear if the pledged amount was distributed within six weeks, anecdotal evidence indicates that OFDA funding for the tsunami was timely and flexible: First, OFDA funding was available almost immediately—even before any private funds materialized. Second, OFDA funding was available to some long-term implementing partners within hours of the tsunami. Verbal assurances of funding were provided to the partner before a grant or formal commitment was made and the implementing agency was able to start relief activities straight away. Third, once the scale of private funding for relief became clear, OFDA allowed its funds

to be used for longer term-activities—up to a year instead of the more-traditional six months or less—which allowed partners to plan further along the relief-rehabilitation-development continuum.<sup>21</sup>

**Can funding be reallocated to other crises?** Funding designated for the Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund cannot be reallocated to other crises. Funding within the response, however, was and is flexible. In consultation with OFDA, implementing partners were able to shift funds between sectors based on changing needs. For example, in some cases funding originally intended for cash-for-work activities was used for broader livelihoods activities. While in some cases, a formal grant modification was required, in many cases changes in programmes were made simply through an exchange of emails.

**What mechanisms does the donor have to mobilise funding?**

In addition to existing programme fund and International Disaster and Famine Assistance funds (IDFA), USAID has two other important funding mechanisms—both of which were used to fund the tsunami humanitarian response: Redirecting programme funds and Congressional supplemental appropriations. During a crisis, programme funds from across the world can be redirected towards a humanitarian effort. Decisions on which programme funds can be shifted are usually made at the regional level.

The Congressional supplemental appropriation is a slower process, but allows the USG to access funds in addition to existing funds. In the tsunami response, the supplemental Congressional appropriation was used to reimburse funds used by agencies in the drawdown.

The Department of Defense used another funding mechanism: the Presidential drawdown. The President has the authority to drawdown resources in order to fund an unforeseen emergency overseas. For the tsunami, funds were shifted from non-essential areas in the DOD to cover the immediate cost of the response.

**3· Needs based funding**

**To what extent did tsunami funding follow a needs-oriented approach and allocate funding on the basis of needs assessments? What criteria were followed? Was there a shared analysis of needs? How were needs assessed?**

Needs assessments were done primarily by the Disaster Assessment Response Teams (DARTs), which were comprised of technical experts as well as field and information officers. DARTs used a variety of sources of information including: visual observations during site visits, input from the U.S. Embassy, USAID Mission, local government, local and international NGOs, UN organisations, U.S. military reports and the media.

Generally, OFDA’s funding strategy and priorities are based on ongoing daily updates by the teams in the field. The response is therefore highly fluid and shifts with the changing needs on the field. This flexible system was used during the tsunami response. DARTs used the Incident

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<sup>21</sup> Alex Mahoney, Programme Officer, OFDA Jakarta.

Command System (ICS) of onsite disaster management and decision-making and in collaboration with headquarters, made all critical decisions in the response.

At times, U.S. strategic interests may compel OFDA to respond to a disaster which does not have extreme humanitarian needs. In the case of the tsunami, however, OFDA's response—and the USG response as a whole—was needs driven. OFDA's unusually high funding of livelihoods and psychosocial activities is a demonstration of how the funding flows were directed by needs assessments from the field. Furthermore, in response to the huge amount of private funds available for the relief response, OFDA actually cut back on its relief funding to prevent overloading the absorption capacity of the affected areas and to ensure that its funds were directed to the areas in greatest need.

#### **What role did appeals play (Flash appeals, Governments, UN, NGOs)?**

In general, USG funding to various appeals is based on needs assessments done by the DARTs and reputable partners—MSF or WHO, for example. If the appeal addresses the factors outlined in the needs assessment, the USG will provide funding for it. If not, funding will go to the organisations that best address these needs.

Funding for appeals for the tsunami followed a similar pattern. Immediately after the tsunami, USAID/OFDA provided \$4 million to an IFRC preliminary funding appeal. While the USG response to the Flash Appeal was larger in volume—\$48,059,388—it represented just 4.5% of the entire appeal. By way of comparison, Japan contributed \$288,900,000 (21.4%) and private funds provided 20.4% of the total appeal.

#### **4. Beneficiary participation**

**Was funding directed in a manner that supported beneficiary participation? Provide criteria for forms of funding that favour beneficiary participation.** The USG structure for the relief response—positioning assessment teams on the ground that are in constant communication both with actors on the field and with decision-makers in Washington—ensured that funding was directly connected with the needs on the ground. As with most relief responses, beneficiary participation initially played a limited role in directing funding flows. Funding was directed primarily through NGOs that had worked in-country and had existing relationships with the local communities.

As the response moved out of the emergency relief phase, beneficiary participation increased in importance and now plays a key role in reconstruction activities. Working with local NGOs, such as EXNORA in India, is one method USAID is currently using to ensure local participation. USAID is also working directly with communities to ensure beneficiary participation. In Indonesia, for example, USAID is working with communities to facilitate participatory planning to identify local needs for future USAID-funded projects.

## **5. Disaster preparedness and mitigation**

**What efforts if any have been undertaken in disaster risk reduction, mitigation, preparedness? Including efforts engaged prior to the disaster and tsunami funding committed for this purpose: amount and percentage. Does the donor have a specific budget line for this purpose?**

Through support for programmes in disaster mitigation, preparedness, and training, USAID/OFDA seeks to address the underlying hazards and vulnerabilities that create disaster risks and exacerbate impacts."<sup>22</sup> OFDA does not have a specific budget line dedicated to disaster mitigation but every year, OFDA spends 10-15% of its budget on disaster preparedness and mitigation depending on the need.<sup>23</sup>

(see p. 15 for USG activities in disaster risk reduction, mitigation and preparedness and efforts prior to the tsunami in this sector).

## **6. Linkages to recovery and development**

**What measures have been undertaken to provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development?**

**List support measures (coordination with development departments, % of social budget foreseen in reconstruction phase)**

Linking relief to rehabilitation and development is one of USAID's explicit points of focus. Development objectives were incorporated into the relief effort from the beginning of the response.

For example, in addition to traditional relief-to-development efforts such as moving from temporary shelter to permanent buildings, USAID/OFDA focused on psychosocial health and livelihoods during the relief phase. Activities in both sectors were designed to support recovery and long-term development.

OFDA also awarded contracts or grants for a year or more—instead of the usual six months. This allowed implementing partners to take a longer-term view in project planning.

## **7. UN Coordination and ICRC/IFRC mandate**

**To what extent and how has the donor supported OCHA's and other key humanitarian UN agency coordinating and ICRC/IFRC specific roles in the tsunami disaster?**

USAID has actively supported the coordination role of UN agencies during humanitarian responses. During the tsunami response, OFDA initially provided assistance to the Humanitarian Information Centres. USAID also regularly provides support to OCHA—contributing more than \$38.6 million since 2000.

**How has the flow of funds been coordinated internationally and nationally?**

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<sup>22</sup> USAID/DCHA Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance's Disaster Guidance Cable For Disaster Planning and Response - FY 2005

<sup>23</sup> Interview with Rob Thayer,

On 29 December, Australia, India, Japan and the United States formed a donor group to coordinate relief and military capacities in the region. By 6 January, this group joined the efforts of OCHA as the lead agency.<sup>24</sup>

**Provide the level of funding provided for UN coordination and ICRC/IFRC mandate. Describe what measures if any are undertaken by the donor to promote that organizations and other actors funded respect UN and RC roles.**

#### **8. Effect on other crises**

**How and with what resources has the response to the tsunami been funded? Have funds that were intended for other crises been diverted? Has the generous response to the Tsunami affected funding of other emergencies in 2005?**

USAID/OFDA's humanitarian response was funded almost entirely through Congressional supplemental appropriations. OFDA's funding commitment to the tsunami was to provide the forward funds for the immediate response. Funding for other programmes was diverted only temporarily and was fully reimbursed by the supplemental appropriation. The only real impact was a delay in funding of some projects. All critical projects continued to receive funds in a timely manner.

#### **9. Predictability and flexibility**

**Has the donor engaged efforts to ensure predictability and flexibility in funding to support key humanitarian organization?**

**Which agencies have been funded? Are they regarded as *key* and what have been the selection criteria?** Most of funding for the humanitarian response went to NGOs. For a complete list, see Annex 1 on p. 26.

**How flexible and predictable have funding mechanisms proved?**

**Could key organizations rely on donor for funding?** As outlined on p. 19, OFDA funding for the tsunami was flexible and predictable for long-term partners. In an effort to ensure a rapid response, OFDA allowed some partners to move ahead with activities without a formal grant agreement in place, with a verbal or email assurance of the availability of funding. In this sense organisations could rely on OFDA for funding. Once the response was underway, OFDA funds proved to be very flexible in that projects were altered while underway in response to the rapidly-changing needs of the surrounding environment. As mentioned earlier, funds used in the humanitarian response had Notwithstanding Authority, so standard clauses which may have slowed down the response, were waived.

#### **10. Appeals and Action Plan**

**Has the donor contributed responsibly, and on the basis of burden-sharing, to United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and to International Red Cross and Red**

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<sup>24</sup> CRS Report to Congress RL32715. p. 11

### **Crescent Movement appeals, and actively supported the formulation of Common Humanitarian Action Plans?**

USAID provides support UN appeals on an ad hoc basis. Each appeal is measured against USAID's own analysis of the disaster, which in turn is based on internal and external needs assessments.

Historically, the US has been the largest single donor to the Consolidated Appeals Plans. For example, in 2002 the US accounted for 38.2% of the grand total for funding (all appeals), 31.6% in 2003 and 32.8% in 2004.

In addition to providing funds, the US government also provides support at the field level by urging partner organisations to play an active role in contributing to CAPs and by ensuring official USG presence at CAPs meetings.

The United States is the largest donor to the ICRC, accounting for 22.04% of all contributions received and 24.09% of contributions for field operations.<sup>25</sup> While the US also responds to ICRC appeals on a case by case basis, it is a significant funder--in 2005 the US responded with \$107.4million to the ICRC 2005 Emergency Appeal.

In terms of the tsunami response, on 26 December, the IFRC launched a preliminary regional appeal for \$6.6 million. USAID/OFDA contributed \$4 million to the appeal.

### **11. Response capacity**

**Has the donor supported mechanisms for contingency planning by humanitarian organisations, including, as appropriate, allocation of funding, to strengthen capacities for response? ⇒List contingency planning mechanisms and types of funding that strengthen response capacity (i.e. training, professionalisation of staff, disaster preparedness, emergency stocks, contingency funds, disaster response teams).** USAID/OFDA is committed to increasing professionalism among emergency aid providers and regularly funds capacity building efforts to that effect. For example, USAID/OFDA has funded staff training programme for NGOs through InterAction and RedR. This includes funding to the Emergency Personnel Network, which is designed to help NGOs recruit, train, and retain personnel for emergency operations. Through this and other programmes, USAID contributes to increasing professionalisation of humanitarian aid actors.

### **12. Civilian humanitarian action**


Nationally, the flow of funds was controlled by an inter-agency working group comprised of the Department of State, USAID, National Security Council, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Transportation, FEMA and the CIA.

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<sup>25</sup> Finance and Administration. Extract from ICRC Annual report 2004.  
<http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList93/522114365513FB9BC125701B0055A383>

**What efforts have been engaged in affirming primary position of civilian organisations in the implementation of humanitarian action? If military assets were provided, did the donor ensure that civilian organisations had an overarching role over the military in the humanitarian response? And if so, list measures that were undertaken.**

As outlined above, the U.S. military played a supporting role in the relief response. In all overseas humanitarian aid response, USAID/OFDA is the designated lead USG agency. The chart below provides an overview of the DOD management lines for the tsunami response. Note: Dotted lines indicate coordination; solid lines indicate lines of authority.



### 13. Evaluation

**Has the donor supported the evaluation of the tsunami response?**

**Is the donor supporting the TEC with funds?** USAID/OFDA is providing a total of \$120,000 in support for the TEC. This includes \$30,000 for the TEC Secretariat at ALNAP; a \$30,000 grant to OCHA for the Coordination Study; a \$30,000 grant to WHO in support of the Needs Assessment Study and; a \$30,000 grand to UNDP for the Local Capacities Study.

**Is the donor carrying out its own evaluation processes?** USAID is carrying out its own evaluation process. OFDA has already completed an After Action Review

**Did the donor cooperate with the evaluation (agree to the interview, provide necessary data and information)? Is the donor interested in the results of the TEC?** USAID have cooperated with several interview requests, both in DC and in the field, and remain very interested in the outcome of the TEC studies.

### 14. Financial transparency and accountability

**What efforts have been engaged to ensure accuracy, timeliness and transparency in donor reporting on official humanitarian tsunami response spending? How has the donor reported its contributions?**

Internally, a representative from the Office of Inspector General (OIG) has been present throughout USAID's tsunami response to ensure high levels of accountability. USAID/OFDA has sought to increase transparency by providing on its website detailed financial information about the humanitarian response, implementing partners and nature of activities.

USAID ensures accountability and timeliness through its reports to Congress.

Previously, USAID had gaps in reporting spending to the FTS. This was, in part, due to different financial reporting systems and definitions. After considerable discussion on the matter, OFDA is now providing to OCHA monthly financial updates on its official humanitarian assistance.

#### **IV. Decision making criteria**

**Have past experiences had an influence on decision-making processes and if so what are the principles and criteria?** The way in which USG decision-makers have responded to disaster has changed over time.

First, the USG has greatly strengthened internal coordination to ensure a timelier and efficient relief response. Coordination between the Department of Defense and USAID, for example, has increased over the past few years. The USG tsunami response was a successful example of this partnership. For example, the USS Abraham Lincoln was able to produce thousands of gallons of drinking water, which in coordination with FPP—which bought containers from local markets—was able to drop clean water by helicopter to inaccessible areas.<sup>26</sup>

Within USAID, the Agency has adopted a more holistic approach to humanitarian responses. In the past, for example, OFDA would handle emergency relief, the Food for Peace Program would separately handle food aid and eventually, the appropriate regional bureau would take over for the reconstruction phase. This approach impacted the timeliness and efficiency of the response. Now, the links between relief, rehabilitation and development have been significantly tightened. Relief is done with a view to reconstruction and development—indeed, when possible rehabilitation activities are integrated into the relief phase from the beginning of the response.

More specifically, USAID's development and use of tools, such as the Incident Command System—which increases coordination and gives particular weight to decision-making from the field—is the direct result of learning from past experiences.

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<sup>26</sup> USAID Administrator Natsios Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 10 February, 2005. ([www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov))

Many of these changes have come about from lessons learned in the Hurricane Mitch response and have also been informed by USG involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan and Mozambique.<sup>27</sup>

**Have these criteria been developed in collaboration with others or are they part of a top down approach?** Criteria were developed on collaboration with others based on lessons learned from previous disasters.

**Was specific criteria utilized for decision-making or were decisions taken on an ad hoc basis?** The Administrator's principles for the relief response (outlined on p. 26) provided not only the strategy for the response but created the parameters for decision-makers. Within these parameters, decisions were made on an as-needed basis: Are decisions respectful of national governments? Are decisions for relief ensuring strong linkages to long term rehabilitation (including disaster preparedness and mitigation)? Are decisions for relief ensuring the rebuilding of livelihoods? Are decisions complementing the efforts of local people; are decisions meeting needs on the ground?<sup>28</sup>

The USG reconstruction effort was built around five themes:

1. Using relief to foster reconstruction, self-sufficiency and build a foundation for future development.
2. Providing technical assistance to affected governments.
3. Providing financial and technical support to rebuild and improve infrastructure.
4. Helping individuals rejoin the workforce and return to their communities.
5. Building the capacity within the affected governments to prepare for and respond to future disasters.

**Did agency competence (organizational capacity, experience, ability to raise funds, quality of proposal) or needs assessments play a role in decision making?** Agency technical competency and experience in the field were both key requirements in terms of decision making. Within the USG, technical competence played an important role in the decision-making process. For example, the nature of the disaster required, amongst other things, expertise in seismic activity, oceans and the atmosphere. The tsunami response thus saw the development of non-traditional partnerships with agencies that provided this expertise—NOAA, USGS and the US Forest Service. The ability of the Defense Department to take action in ways others initially could not also played into the USG decisions.

For NGOs, organisational capacity, previous experience with USAID and in-country experience were important factors that played a role in the USG decision making process.

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<sup>27</sup> USAID Administrator Natsios Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 10 February, 2005. ([www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov))

<sup>28</sup> Andrew Natsios remarks. 11 January 2005. [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)

**How much of the funding allocated was supply driven?** USG response to the tsunami was needs driven. Funds were shifted from relief to reconstruction in response to the huge flow of private funds for the relief effort.

As the relief response was being implemented, USAID was very aware of the unusual funding situation of the tsunami response, where pledges often appeared even before requests for funding. In a speech in Geneva on 11 January, USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios said the following,

*It's also important that we understand that the first responders in any disaster are the people themselves, the people who survived, the neighbors of the ones who were there, and very quickly begin to respond to the emergency. Our job is not to take over their efforts, not to substitute their efforts, but to support their efforts.*

*It needs to be consistent with our own principle of disaster response, which is what we call a "pull" system, rather than a "push" system. We don't want to push resources into the field; we want the people in the field to pull resources from donor governments and central governments as they are needed on the ground.* <sup>29</sup>

## **V. Response strategy**

### **Provide an overview and appraisal of standing donor state disaster response for the tsunami.**

The USG response was fairly rapid. With 48 hours, both DART and the DOD assessment teams were on-site. The USG was able to mobilise its vast resources of personnel, assets and funds to address the multi-country, multi-sectoral needs created by the tsunami. While military involvement in humanitarian responses remains very much an issue of debate, the use U.S. military assets was hugely important in the immediate response.

**Was there a specific strategy being implemented and if so what are the main features of this strategy?** USAID had an overall strategy for the tsunami response. The strategy focussed on the following:

1. To respect the national governments of the impacted countries. Relief must be carried out with recognition of the authority and responsibility of the national governments.
2. To move out of the relief phase as quickly as possible and into rehabilitation and reconstruction. This will lessen dependency and ensure that funds are spent for permanent reconstruction.
3. To focus on rebuilding livelihoods and lessening the terrible economic impact of the tsunami. In addition to livelihoods, examine possibilities for microfinance and banking systems.
4. To complement and support the relief efforts of local people.
5. To ensure that resources are allocated based on needs on the ground
6. To put in place disaster mitigation and prevention measures.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)

<sup>30</sup> Andrew Natsios remarks. 11 January 2005. [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)

**To what extent did the donor take into account the conflict situations in Indonesia and Sri Lanka and carry out conflict mapping and analysis?** Both USAID and the DOD took the conflict situations in Indonesia and Sri Lanka into account. In Indonesia, there were initial concerns that the conflict would impact the relief effort. This concern never materialized as most of the high conflict areas were located farther inland.

The Department of Defense Disaster Response Assessment Teams (DRATS) carried out risk assessments which included “force protection” to ensure that operations were carried out with minimum risk to US forces. One result of the assessments was that some of the US forces involved in the relief operation were armed. This was done with the consent of the host government.

**Was a risk analysis or ex-ante evaluation undertaken prior to specific intervention and if not how was a risk assessed?** Implementing organisations and technical experts were responsible for conducting risk analysis.

**Have funding strategies been adapted over time to the needs of the affected countries, and if so what are the external influences that caused these changes.** The funding strategy for the tsunami was adapted over time. One of the primary external influences on the change of strategy was the influx of private funding for the relief response. The combination of massive amounts of private funds combined with the absorption capacity of the tsunami-affected areas reduced the need USG funds.

**Has the donor state engaged in efforts to facilitate donor agreement on common operational objectives?** USAID actively participated in efforts to facilitate donor agreement on common operational objectives. In Indonesia, for example, USAID participated in the Consultative Group for Indonesia meeting, at which the Government of Indonesia presented the initial damage assessment. USAID has also collaborated closely with and provided technical assistance to Indonesia’s Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh and Nias (BRR). USAID also participated as an observer, on the Steering Committee of the Multi Donor Trust Fund for Aceh and Nias. More recently, USAID participated in the Coordination Forum for Aceh and Nias and in the preparatory meetings.

## **VI. Human Resources**

**To what extent were responsibilities assigned and how were personnel needs addressed? Were additional means provided? Were responsibilities to manage these funds delegated adequately? Did donors provide support to staff in order to administer, distribute and allocate funds in an effective manner?** The DARTs are comprised of personnel from a range of USG agencies. Staff was also moved for short-term tsunami-related assignments from USAID Washington, USAID Egypt and other countries to bolster capacities in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. When available, USAID Missions drew on in-country staff and contractor personnel to assist

with the relief and reconstruction effort. To better meet the reconstruction needs in Sri Lanka, USAID created three additional full-time expatriate positions.

Missions were delegated authority to manage the funds. There is considerable flexibility both in terms of funding and operations to address relief needs; however reconstruction funds are far less flexible. Congress must be advised by USG agencies receiving reconstruction funds on how they are being spent.

**Was staff withdrawn from other operations and crises to address tsunami operation needs?** Staff were withdrawn temporarily from other operations (see above), but not from other crisis.

**What efforts, if any, were engaged to ensure professional humanitarian staff at donor and implementing actor level?** The two largest USG agencies involved—USAID and the DOD—provide regular training for their personnel to ensure high levels of professionalism.

### Annex 1. Breakdown of USG humanitarian funds by actor

Funding agency	Implementation	Org	Committed	Activity	Location	USD Amount	
						Cash	Kind
STATE/PRM	Inter govt	IOM	200,000	Anti-trafficking initiatives	Indonesia	200,000	
USAID/FFP	UN	WFP	10,615,840	8220 MT of P.L. 480 Title II emergency food assistance	Sri Lanka		10,615,840
USAID/FFP	UN	WFP	2,438,560	3000MT of PL 480 Title II emergency food assistance	Indonesia		2,438,560
USAID/INDONESIA	Inter govt.	IOM	208,452	Logistics	Indonesia	208,452	
USAID/INDONESIA	Inter govt.	IOM	1,650,000	Emergency relief activities	Indonesia	1,650,000	
USAID/INDONESIA	NGO	ICMC	100,000	Targeting/monitoring of relief supplies	Indonesia	100,000	
USAID/INDONESIA	NGO	CARDI	99,960	Emergency response teams	Indonesia	99,960	
USAID/INDONESIA	NGO	CARE	98,889	Water and sanitation	Indonesia	98,889	
USAID/INDONESIA	NGO	IRD	99,974	Emergency food assistance	Indonesia	99,974	
USAID/INDONESIA	NGO	Mercy Corps	250,000	Shelter, health, water, and trauma counselling	Indonesia	250,000	
USAID/INDONESIA	NGO	Nurani Dunia	99,669	Emergency relief supplies	Indonesia	99,669	
USAID/INDONESIA	NGO	SC/US	100,000	Emergency relief supplies and health	Indonesia	100,000	
USAID/INDONESIA	Unspecified	Multiple*	2,087,000	Emergency relief activities	Indonesia	2,087,000	
USAID/INDONESIA	USG	Naval Medical Research Unit	579,000	Procurement and staffing of reference library	Indonesia		579,000
USAID/OFDA	IFRC/ICRC	IFRC	4,000,000	Response to emergency appeal	Region	4,000,000	
USAID/OFDA	IFRC/ICRC	IFRC (implemented by Indian Red Cross)	50,000	Emergency relief activities	India	50,000	
USAID/OFDA	IFRC/ICRC	IFRC/Indonesian Red Cross	2,100,000	Emergency relief supplies	Indonesia	2,100,000	
USAID/OFDA	IFRC/ICRC	Indonesian Red Cross	99,050	Emergency relief supplies (in kind)	Indonesia		99,050
USAID/OFDA	IFRC/ICRC	IRC	3,507,231	Water and sanitation, mobile health clinics, support for public health networks, psychological and social activities, and immediate impact livelihoods activities	Indonesia	3,507,231	

Funding agency	Implementation	Org	Committed	Activity	Location	USD Amount	
						Cash	Kind
USAID/OFDA	IFRC/ICRC	Malaysia Red Crescent	25,000	Procurement/distribution of relief items and shelter materials	Malaysia	25,000	
USAID/OFDA	IFRC/ICRC	Seychelles Red Cross	50,000	Emergency relief activities	Seychelles	50,000	
USAID/OFDA	IFRC/ICRC	Sri Lanka Red Cross	356,655	Emergency relief supplies and shelter	Sri Lanka		356,655
USAID/OFDA	IFRC/ICRC	Thai Red Cross	100,000	Procurement and distribution of relief items	Thailand	100,000	
USAID/OFDA	Inter govt	IOM	500,000	Provision of emergency relief supplies, shelter, food, water and medicine	Sri Lanka	500,000	
USAID/OFDA	Inter govt.	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	1,000,000	Provision of emergency relief supplies, shelter, food, water and medicine	Indonesia	1,000,000	
USAID/OFDA	Nat'l Govt	National Disaster Management and Relief Committee	25,000	Procurement/distribution of relief items and shelter materials	Malaysia	25,000	
USAID/OFDA	Nat'l Govt	Prime Minister's Relief Fund	50,000	Emergency relief activities	India	50,000	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	ACF/France	403,763	Emergency relief supplies, water and sanitation	Sri Lanka	403,763	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	ACF/France (Action Contre le Faim)	400,000	wat/san and emergency household kits	Indonesia	400,000	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	ACTED	297,934	Livelihoods	India	297,934	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	AirServ	200,131	Transport of relief supplies and light cargo	Indonesia	200,131	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	AirServ	1,502,359	Aerial assessment, transport of relief personnel and light cargo	Region	1,502,359	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	AirServ	633,139	Transport of relief supplies and light cargo	Indonesia	633,139	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	CARE	50,000	Procurement and delivery of emergency relief supplies	Indonesia	50,000	

Funding agency	Implementation	Org	Committed	Activity	Location	USD Amount	
						Cash	Kind
USAID/OFDA	NGO	CARE	1,941,787	Emergency relief supplies, water system and rehabilitation	Sri Lanka	1,941,787	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	CARE	650,000	Water and sanitation	India	650,000	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	CARE	256,276	Water purification	Indonesia	256,276	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	Catholic Relief Services	488,435	Cash for work	Indonesia	488,435	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	CCF	2,310,294	Cash for work, community rehabilitation, psychological and social support	Sri Lanka	2,310,294	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	CHF International	3,000,000	Cash for work, debris clean-up, repair of schools and public buildings, latrine construction, and water and sanitation	Sri Lanka	3,000,000	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	Christian Children's Fund	393,188	Child protection and psychological and social support	Indonesia	393,188	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	Church World Service	221,375	psychological and social support for children	Indonesia	221,375	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	CRS	3,048,000	Transitional shelter, home repair, latrine construction	Sri Lanka	3,048,000	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	CRS	1,050,000	Water and sanitation, psychological and social support	India	1,050,000	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	DAI (Development Alternatives Inc)	5,000,000	Immediate relief and rehabilitation interventions through local and international NGOs	Indonesia	5,000,000	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	EXNORA	115,195	Cash for work and water and sanitation	India	115,195	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	FHI (Food for the Hungry)	280,147	Livelihoods and debris removal	India	280,147	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	GOAL	3,280,423	Shelter, water and sanitation and cash for work activities	Sri Lanka	3,280,423	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	GOAL	250,112	Cash for work and rehabilitation of agricultural land	India	250,112	

Funding agency	Implementation	Org	Committed	Activity	Location	USD Amount	
						Cash	Kind
USAID/OFDA	NGO	IMC	2,292,129	Mobile health units, rehabilitation of local health clinics, malaria control and psychological and social activities	Indonesia	2,292,129	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	International Medical Corps (IMC)	585,000	Health	Indonesia	585,000	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	IRD	1,785,197	Watsan, microfinance and livelihoods recovery	Indonesia	1,785,197	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	Johns Hopkins/JHPIEGO	254,023	Maternal and child health	Indonesia	254,023	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	Mercy Corps	1,613,831	Community infrastructure rehabilitation (cash for work), micro finance, emergency response activities and livelihoods recovery	Indonesia	1,613,831	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	Mercy Corps	1,509,447	Cash for work, community rehabilitation and watsan	Sri Lanka	1,509,447	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	PCI (Project Concern International)	1,564,250	Health, water and sanitation, and livelihoods recovery	Indonesia	1,564,250	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	PCI (Project Concern International)	440,295	Shelter, livelihoods and training	India	440,295	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	Sarvodaya	1,748,120	Cash for work, debris clean up, repair of buildings and watsan	Sri Lanka	1,748,120	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	SC/UK	630,620	Shelter, water and sanitation and emergency relief supplies	Sri Lanka	630,620	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	SC/US	50,000	Procurement and delivery of emergency relief supplies	Indonesia	50,000	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	SC/US	1,189,772	Emergency health, sanitation, shelter, protection and relief activities	Indonesia	1,189,772	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	Shelter for Life	1,026,185	Transitional shelter and latrine construction	Sri Lanka	1,026,185	

Funding agency	Implementation	Org	Committed	Activity	Location	USD Amount	
						Cash	Kind
USAID/OFDA	NGO	The Asia Foundation	199,408	Child protection and psychological and social activities	Sri Lanka	199,408	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	World Concern	391,802	Emergency Relief Activities	Somalia	391,802	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	WVI	249,985	Shelter and household kits	Indonesia	249,985	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	WVI	499,849	Emergency relief supplies and shelter	Sri Lanka	499,849	
USAID/OFDA	NGO	WVI	859,992	Shelter and cash for work	India	859,992	
USAID/OFDA	NGO (US)	American Centre for International Labour	350,000	Psychological and social support including anti-trafficking	Sri Lanka	350,000	
USAID/OFDA	Private consulting	Nathan Associates	10,000,000	Cash for work, community rehabilitation, livelihoods and microfinance projects	Sri Lanka	10,000,000	
USAID/OFDA	UN	OCHA	141,369	Coordination	Somalia	141,369	
USAID/OFDA	UN	UNDP	200,000	Psychological and social support	India	200,000	
USAID/OFDA	UN	UNDP	100,000	Income generation	Seychelles	100,000	
USAID/OFDA	UN	UNHCR	200,000	Shelter, emergency relief supplies	Somalia	200,000	
USAID/OFDA	UN	UNICEF	1,500,000	Child protection and psychological and social activities	Indonesia	1,500,000	
USAID/OFDA	UN	UNICEF	1,500,000	Water and sanitation, emergency school kits, child protection and psychological and social activities	Sri Lanka	1,500,000	
USAID/OFDA	UN	UNICEF	94,600	Emergency relief supplies (in kind contribution)	Maldives		94,600
USAID/OFDA	UN	UNICEF	1,200,000	Health, nutrition, water and sanitation	Maldives	1,200,000	
USAID/OFDA	UN	UNICEF	50,000	Health	Somalia	50,000	
USAID/OFDA	UN	UNICEF	250,000	Health	Somalia	250,000	
USAID/OFDA	UN	WFP	5,000,000	Logistics, air support and coordination	Region	5,000,000	
USAID/OFDA	UN	WHO	291,500	Health surveillance	Indonesia	291,500	
USAID/OFDA	Unspecified	Multiple	585,230	Relief commodities	Region		585,230
USAID/OFDA	Unspecified	Multiple	959,485	Administrative	Region	959,485	

Funding agency	Implementation	Org	Committed	Activity	Location	USD Amount	
						Cash	Kind
USAID/OFDA	Unspecified	Multiple	1,232,000	Transport of relief supplies	Region	1,232,000	
USAID/OFDA	Unspecified	Multiple	74,002	Transport of relief supplies	Indonesia	74,002	
USAID/OFDA	Unspecified	Multiple	109,000	Administrative/other	Indonesia	109,000	
USAID/OFDA	Unspecified	Multiple	500,432	Relief commodities (in kind contributions)	Indonesia		500,432
USAID/OFDA	Unspecified	Multiple	504,137	Transport and commodities	Sri Lanka	504,137	
USAID/OFDA	Unspecified	Multiple	635,773	Administrative/Other support	Sri Lanka	635,773	
USAID/OFDA	Unspecified	Multiple	68,400	Transport of relief supplies	Maldives	68,400	
USAID/OFDA	USG	USAID/Indonesia	136,766	Emergency grants for water and sanitation, health and shelter	Indonesia	136,766	
USAID/OFDA	USG	Administrative	36,200	Administrative	India	36,200	
USAID/OFDA	USG	administrative	218,871	Regional administrative support	Thailand	218,871	
USAID/OFDA	USG	US Geological Survey	15,000	Damage assessment	Maldives	15,000	
USAID/OFDA	USG	USAID/OTI	2,500,000	Relief and recovery projects through existing DAI contract with USAID/OTI	Sri Lanka	2,500,000	
USAID/OFDA	USG	USAID/Sri Lanka	95,449	Emergency relief activities* (allocated to implementing partners based on needs assessment)	Sri Lanka	95,449	
USAID/OFDA	USG	USAID/Sri Lanka	100,000	Emergency relief activities	Sri Lanka	100,000	
USDA	UN	WFP	7,533,600	9417 MT of P.L. 416 (b) Title I emergency food assistance	Indonesia		7,533,600
USDA	UN	WFP	4,466,400	5,583 MT of P.L. 416 (b) Title I emergency food assistance	Sri Lanka		4,466,400
<b>Total</b>			<b>113,800,957</b>			<b>86,531,590</b>	<b>27,269,367</b>

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