Foreword by the
United Nations Secretary-General's
Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery
In the immediate weeks following the Indian Ocean tsunami
disaster of 26 December 2004, many of us pledged that this
operation would set new standards of accountability and
transparency. We also pledged that out of the rubble of the Indian
Ocean's coastlines, and the suffering of its inhabitants, we would
'build back better': placing coastal communities on a better
development path; leaving survivors safer from future disasters;
using the lessons learned today to ensure better responses in the
future. A disaster of this scale and a response of such sweeping
breadth and generosity deserve nothing less.
Therefore, I was greatly encouraged to see, in the early months
of 2005, over 40 key aid agencies - including the United Nations,
donor governments and non-government organisations - join hands to
form the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), an historic,
collaborative process to evaluate key elements of the relief and
recovery effort. The TEC represents an extraordinary effort at
reflection, self-criticism and transparency. The studies it has
sponsored, and this Synthesis Report, provide an invaluable,
independent account of how the tsunami response has proceeded so
far.
As reflected in the pages that follow, our efforts to respond to
the tsunami have placed in sharp relief both strengths and
weaknesses in the way we organize ourselves when faced with such
massive challenges. Indeed, the report includes both praise and
uncomfortable reading, but the honesty of the analysis does us all
a great service.
This report and the companion thematic studies identify
important lessons and an agenda for reform that deserve careful
analysis and an appropriate response. They help us to see how we
can and must do better in responding to ongoing and future disaster
relief and recovery challenges.
To my mind, the overriding messages of this report are
three-fold:
First, we must do better at utilizing and working alongside
local structures. With nothing but good intentions, the
international community descends into crisis situations in enormous
numbers and its activities too often leave the very communities we
are there to help on the sidelines. Local structures are already in
place and more often than not the 'first responders' to a crisis.
The way the international community goes about providing relief and
recovery assistance must actively strengthen, not undermine, these
local actors.
Second, we must find the will and the resources to invest much
more in risk reduction and preparedness measures. Local structures
and local measures - whether part of national or provincial
government efforts or embedded in the communities - need to be
strengthened to reduce vulnerabilities to tomorrow's disasters. And
international and local actors need to forge solid partnerships
between and among themselves, well in advance of their being tested
in crisis.
Third, we must translate good intentions into meaningful reform.
The report identifies critical systemic challenges for the
humanitarian community, many of which were analyzed at length in
the aftermath of the Rwanda crisis and have already been included
in a range of standards and codes of conduct. But the fact that we
continue to struggle to turn these principles into practice, as
this report highlights, demands that we set about on our shared
agenda for reform with the courage and commitment necessary to see
the process through to full implementation.
The final story of the tsunami recovery process has yet to be
written. This is a multi-year effort, which makes it even more
important that we pay close heed to the analysis and
recommendations in this report. I ask you to commit to helping us
multiply our successes, realign our efforts where necessary, and
retain the spirit of openness and self-criticism that this report
so ably embodies.
William Jefferson Clinton